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56 Preface 
The  adoption  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89 of 21  December  1989  on  the control of con-
centrations  between  undertakings  has  provided  the 
Community  with  a specific  instrument  which  forms 
an essential complement to existing Community com-
petition law. 
The  merger  control  system  set  up  by  the  regulation, 
which  entered  into  force  on  21  September  1990,  is 
supplemented by the implementing and interpretative 
provisions  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  25  July 
1990.  Together,  they  form  the  entire  body of merger 
control legislation so far adopted by the Community. 
It  is  clearly  useful  for  companies  subject  to  merger 
control and those having to deal  with such matters to 
have a single reference source available. 
This Supplement is intended to meet that need. 
5 -lo Introduction 
(Extract from  the  Nineteenth  Report  on  Competition 
Policy, Brussels /990) 
On  21  December,  the  Council  adopted the  Commis-
sion's  proposal  on  the  control  of  concentrations 
between  undertakings.  1 The  regulation  will  form  a 
cornerstone of competition  policy and  make  a major 
contribution to ensuring success in the completion of 
the internal market. 
Given  the  inadequacy  of the  ex1stmg  competitiOn 
rules  in  dealing  with  the  entire concentration  pheno-
menon at Community level, the need for such a regu-
lation  was recognized  as early as  1973  in the wake of 
the  Continental  Can  judgment. 2  However,  at  that 
time,  the  Council  did  not  give  serious  consideration 
to  the  new  draft  regulation.  The  Commission  tabled 
an  updated  proposal  in  the  autumn  of  1987.  At  its 
meeting on 30 November 1987, the Council adopted a 
generally  positive  attitude  on  the  main  lines  of the 
Commission's approach. 3 
The  progress  made  towards  completing  the  internal 
market and the new political environment provided a 
key  impetus  towards  approval  of the  merger  control 
regulation.  The  logic  of the  single  market  prompted 
Member States to  agree  unanimously on a system  of 
merger  control  at  Community  level  for  Community-
scale mergers. 
Merger  control  is  necessary  for  both  economic  and 
political  reasons.  The  process  of restructuring  Euro-
pean industry has given rise and  will  continue to give 
rise  to  a wave  of mergers.  Although  many  such  mer-
gers  have not posed  any  problems  from  the  competi-
tion point of view, it must be ensured that they do not 
in  the  long  run  jeopardize  the  competition  process, 
which  lies  at  the  heart of the  common market and  is 
essential  in  securing  all  the  benefits  linked  with  the 
single  market.  In  addition,  it  has  become  ever  more 
clearly apparent that national rules are inadequate as 
a  means  of  controlling  Community-scale  mergers, 
mainly because such rules are restricted to  the respec-
tive  territories  of  the  Member  States  concerned. 
Clearly, Community  law  must be applied  in  control-
ling  and  examining  large-scale  mergers,  where  the 
reference  market  is  increasingly the  Community  as  a 
whole  or  a large  part  of it.  The  new  regulation  also 
introduces  a  system  of control  for  Member  States 
which do not have any specific rules in this area. 
The  fundamental  principles  of the  regulation  are  as 
follows: 
(a)  The  basic concept underlying the  regulation  is  to 
establish a clear allocation between Community-scale 
mergers,  for  which  the  Commission  is  responsible, 
and  those  whose  main  impact  is  in  the  territory of a 
Member State,  for  which  the  national  authorities  are 
responsible. 
(b)  In  its  scope,  the  new  regulation  covers  mergers 
having  a Community  dimension,  which  are  defined 
on the basis of three criteria, namely: 
(i)  A threshold of at least  ECU 5 000 million  for the 
aggregate  world-wide  turnover  of all  the  under-
takings  concerned.  This  figure  reflects  the  aggre· 
gate economic and financial  power of the  under-
takings involved in a merger. In the case of finan· 
cial institutions and insurance companies, specific 
criteria are laid down; 
(ii)  A threshold  of at  least  ECU  250 million  for  the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least  two  of the  undertakings  concerned.  Thus, 
only  undertakings  with  a specified  level  of activ-
ity  in  the  Community are  covered  by  the  regula-
tion; 
(iii) A transnationality  criterion.  Community  control 
does  not  apply  if each  of the  undertakings  con-
cerned  achieves  two-thirds  of its  turnover  within 
one  and  the  same  Member  State.  This  criterion 
allows  mergers  whose  impact  is  mainly  national 
to  be excluded  from  the  Community control  sys-
tem. 
OJ  L395, 30.12.1989. 
See  ntird Competition Report. pp.  15 and  16. 
See Snenteenth Competition Report. points 49 to 51. 
7 (c)  The current thresholds were set at a high  level  for 
an  initial stage in  implementing the regulation.  How-
ever,  this  represents  an  important  first  step  in  estab-· 
lishing Community merger control  and  will  probably 
result in some 50 cases being examined a year, on the 
basis  of an  extrapolation  of the statistics  for  the  last 
few  years.  The  thresholds  are  to  be  reviewed  by  the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from  the  Commission,  in  the  light of experience,  no 
later than  four years after the  adoption of the regula-
tion. The Commission's declared intention  is that the 
thresholds  will be revised downwards: the objective is 
to  lower  the  overall  threshold  to  ECU  2 000  million 
and to reduce the Community threshold similarly. 
(d)  All  mergers falling within the scope of the regula-
tion  will  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of clearly  defined 
criteria.  The  basic concept  is  that of 'dominant  posi-
tion'.  The  creation  or  strengthening  of a  dominant 
position  will  be  declared incompatible with  the  com-
mon  market  if effective competition  is  impeded  to  a 
significant extent, whether within the common market 
as  a  whole,  or  in  a  substantial  part  thereof;  con-
versely,  a  merger  which  does  not  impede  effective 
competition  will  be  declared  compatible  with  the 
common  market.  The  assessment  process  will  take 
various  aspects  of competition  into  account.  These 
will  include  the  structure  of the  markets  concerned, 
actual  and  potential  competition  (from  inside  and 
outside  the  Community),  the  market  position  of the 
undertakings  concerned,  the scope  for  choice  on  the 
part of third  parties,  barriers  to  entry, the  interests  of 
consumers and technical and economic progress. This 
overall  list  will  be  used  in  assessing  the  impact of a 
merger on competition. 
(e)  For  the  purposes  of the  regulation,  a 'concentra-
tion'  is  defined  as  the  acquisition  of control  and 
covers  both  mergers  and  acquisitions.  The  definition 
includes  partial  mergers  and  merger-type  joint  ven-
tures,  but  it  does  not  cover  the  coordination  of the 
behaviour  of  undertakings  which  remain  indepen-
dent. 
(f)  So  as  to  ensure  that  control  is  effective  and  that 
undertakings  enjoy legal certainty, the merger control 
arrangements include the following: 
(i)  The  principle of mandatory  prior notification  by 
the  undertakings  concerned.  This  has  a  suspen-
sory  effect  on  the  concentration  for  a period  of 
three weeks (suspension of the concentration may 
be  extended  or,  in  some  cases,  dispensed  with). 
However,  the  validity  of stock-exchange  transac-
tions will not be affected. 
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(ii)  The  setting  of strict  deadlines  to  be  met  by  the 
Commission in its proceedings: 
- The  Commission  has  one  month  following 
notification within which to initiate proceedings.  I 
In  cases  where  the  Commission  does  not  raise 
any  objections  (this  is  likely  to  be  the  general 
rule),  the  parties  will  receive the go-ahead  within 
one month; 
- Four  months  after  the  initiation  of proceed-
ings, the Commission must take its final  decision 
on the concentration. During that period, the par-
ties are free to propose adjustments to the concen-
tration so as to avoid a negative decision; 
(iii) The  Commission's  powers  of  investigation  and 
the fines  provided for in the regulation are similar 
to  those  applicable  to  restrictive  practices.  Furth-
ermore,  the  Commission  may  require  undertak-
ings or assets unlawfully merged to be separated. 
(g)  The regulation  is  based on the principle of exclu-
sivity, but provision  is  made for a few  limited excep-
tions  to this  rule.  The  principle of exclusivity applies 
as follows: 
(i)  All  decisions  relating  to  Community-scale  mer-
gers falling within the scope of the regulation will 
be taken by the Commission. The Member States 
have  undertaken  not  to  apply their  national  law 
to such cases. There will, therefore, be no need for 
concurrent proceedings. 
(ii)  There  are  two  derogations  from  the  principle  of 
exclusivity: 
- The  regulation  provides  for  referral  to  the 
national  authorities  of a  Member  State  where  a 
problem  of a dominant  position  arises  on  a dis-
tinct market within its territory and where applica-
tion  of the  regulation  would  not  achieve  a satis-
factory  solution  to  the  particular  problem.  This 
mechanism  would  normally  apply  to  local  mar-
kets, for example  in distribution or hotels; excep-
tionally,  the  provision  could  also  apply  to  a 
national  market  which  is  to  some extent  isolated 
from  the  rest  of the  Community,  for  example, 
because of high transport costs. 
I  This  period  is  increased  to  six  weeks  if  the  Commission  receives  a 
request from a Member State that a notified merger case be referred to  it 
(see below). - In  cases  where  Member  States  may  invoke 
legitimate interests other than  those  protected  by 
the regulation. These include public security, plur-
ality  of  the  media  and  prudential  rules.  Excep-
tionally,  other  legitimate  interests  may  be  recog-
nized  by  the  Commission  after an  assessment  of 
their compatibility with  Community  law;  certain 
such  legitimate interests  may  be  protected by the 
provisions of national law. In such cases, a Mem-
ber State  may  take  appropriate  measures  to  pro-
tect  such  interests,  which  means  that  they  have 
the power to  prohibit a concentration or to  make 
its  approval  subject  to  additional  conditions  or 
requirements.  However, a Member State may not, 
under  this  heading,  authorize  a  concentration 
which has been prohibited by the Commission. 
(h)  Concentrations  which  are  not  covered  by  the 
Community  regulation  fall  in  principle  within  the 
jurisdiction of the Member States. However, the regu-
lation gives the Commission the power to take action 
with  regard  to  concentrations  that  do  not  have  a 
Community  dimension  at  the  request  of a  Member 
State concerned, in cases where a problem involving a 
dominant  position  arises  within  the  territory  of that-
Member State. 
* 
*  * 
Four  implementing  measures  have  been  adopted  by 
the Commission. 
Two  notices  provide  explanatory  guidelines  on  how 
the  terms  'concentration'  and  'ancillary  restrictions' 
must be  interpreted. These  are technical questions  of 
considerable importance, and the notices were drafted 
in  close collaboration with the Member States, indus-
try and the various other parties concerned. 
A procedural regulation lays down the rights and obli-
gations  of  the  Commission  and  of the  companies 
concerned  in  individual  cases.  This  was  based  on 
existing  procedures,  with  adjustments  being  made 
where necessary to take account of precedents set by 
the  Court of Justice and the specific requirements  of 
merger control. 
A form  has  been  drawn  up  for  notifications.  After 
wide-ranging  consultations,  a  balance  was  struck 
between  the  Commission's  need  to  obtain  full  infor-
mation  from  the  start of a case and the  need to keep 
the  burden  imposed  on  industry  as  light  as  possible. 
The  form  confines  itself  to  the  information  that  is 
necessary for a full  analysis of the  market.  If a com-
pany  cannot  provide  some  of  the  information 
requested  or  is  able  to  show  that some questions  are 
not  relevant  to  examination  of the  case,  it  may  be 
relieved of its obligations. 
9-10 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC)  No 4064/S9 
of 21  December 1989 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
THE COUNCIL OF THE  EUROPEAN  eOMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic Community, and in  particular Articles 87 and 
235  thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from  the Commission (I), 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  European 
_  Parliament (2), 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee('),· 
(I)  Whereas,  for  the  achievement  of  the  aims  of  the 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community, Article 3 (f)  gives  the Community the 
objective  of  instituting  'a  system  ensuring  that 
competition  in  the  common  market  is  not 
distorted' ; 
(2)  Whereas  this  system  is  essential  for  the  achieve-
ment of the internal market by 1992 and its further 
development ; 
(3)  Whereas  the  dismantling  of  internal  frontiers  is 
resulting  and  will  continue  to  result  in  major 
corporate reorganizations in  the Community, parti-
cularly  in  the  form  of  concentrations ; 
(4)  Whereas such a develop~ent must be welcomed as 
being  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  dynamic 
competition and capable of increasing the competi-
tiveness  of  European  industry,  improving  the 
conditions  of  growth  and  raising  the  standard  of 
living  in  the  Community ; 
(5)  Whereas,  however,  it  must  be  ensured  that  the 
process of reorganization does  not result  in  lasting 
damage  to  competition ; whereas  Community law 
must therefore  include  provisions  governing those 
concentrations  which  may  significantly  impede 
effective competition in the common market or in 
a .substantial  part  of  it; 
(6)  Whereas  Articles  85  and  86,  while  applicable, 
according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, to 
certain  concentrations, are  not,  however,  sufficient 
to  .control  all  operations  which  may  prove  to  be 
(')  OJ  No  C  130,  19.  5.  1988,  p.  4. 
(2)  OJ  No  C 309,  5.  12.  1988,  p.  55. 
(')  OJ  No  C  208,  8.  8.  1988,  p.  II. 
(7) 
.(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(II) 
{12) 
incompatible  with  the  system  of  undistorted 
competition  envisaged  in  the  Treaty; 
Whereas  a  new  legal  instrument  should  therefore 
be  created  in  the  form  of  a  Reg-Ulation  to  permit 
effective  control  of  all  concentrations  from  the 
point  of  view  of  their  effect  on  the  struc-ture  of 
competition in the Community and to be the only 
instrument applicable  to  such  concentrations ; 
Whereas this Regulation  should therefore be  based 
not only on Article  87 but,  principally, on  Article 
235  of  the  Treaty,  under which  the  Community 
may  give  itself  the  additional  powers  of  action 
necessary  for  the  attainment  of  its  objectives,  in-
cluding  with  regard  to  concentrations  on  the 
markets for agricultural products listed in Annex II 
to  the  Treaty ; 
Whereas the provisions to be adopted in this Regu-
lation should apply to significant structural changes 
the  impact of which  on  the  market goes  beyond 
the  national  borders  of  any  one  Member  State ; 
Whereas the scope of application of this Regulation 
should  therefore  be  defined  according  to  the 
geographical  area  of  activity  of  the  undertakings 
concerned  and  be  limited  by  quantitative  thres-
holds in. order to cover those concentrations which 
have a Community dimension ; whereas, at the end 
of an  initial phase of the application of this Regula-
tion,  these  thresholds  should  be  reviewed  in  the 
light  of  the  experience  gained ; 
Whereas  a  concentration  with  a  Community 
dimension  exists  where  the  combined  aggregate 
turnover  of  the  undertakings  concerned  exceeds 
given  levels worldwide  and within the Community 
and  where  at  least  two  of  the  undertakings 
concerned have  their sole  or main  fields  of  activi-
ties  in  different Member States  or where,  although 
the undertakings in question act mainly in one and 
the  same  Member  State,  at  least  one of 'them  has 
substantial operations in  at least one other Member 
State ;  whereas  that  is  also  the  case  where  the 
concentrations are  effected  by  undertakings which 
do not have  their principal fields of activities in the 
Community but which  have  substantial  operations 
there; 
Whereas the arrangements to be introduced for  the 
control of concentrations should, without prejudice 
to Article 90 (2) of the Treaty, respect the principle 
of  non-discrimination  between  the  public and the 
11 private sectors ; whereas, in the public sector, calcu-
lation of the turnover of an  undertaking concerned 
in a concentration needs, therefore, to take account 
of undertakings making up an economic unit with 
an  independent power  of decision,  irrespective  of 
the  way  in  which  their  capital  is  held  or of  the 
rules  of  administrative  supervision  applicable  to 
them; 
(13)  Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  establish  whether 
concentrations  with  a  Community dimension  are 
compatible or not with the common market from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  need  to  maintain  and 
develop  effective  competition  in  the  common 
market ;  whereas,  in  so  doing,  the  Commission 
must place  its  appraisal  within  the general  frame-
work of the achievement of the fundamental objec-
tives  referred  to  in Article  2 of the Treaty,  includ-
ing  that  of  strengthening  the  Community's 
economic and social cohesion, referred to in Article 
130a; 
(14)  Whereas this Regulation should establish the  prin-
ciple  that  a  concentration  with  a  Community 
dimension which creates or strengthens a position 
as  a  result  of  which  effective  competition  in  the 
common  market  or  in  a  substantial  part  of  it  is 
significantly  impeded  is  to  be  declared  incom-
patible  with  the  common  market ; 
(  15)  Whereas  concentrations  which,  by  reason  of  the 
li'!'ited  market  share  of  the  undertakings 
concerned,  are  not  liable  to  impede  effective 
competition  may  be  presumed  to  be  compatible 
with the common market; whereas, without preju-
dice to Articles 85  and 8,6  of the Treaty, an  indica-
tion  to  this  effect  exists,  in  particular,  where  the 
market share  of the undertakings  concerned  does 
not exceed  25 % either in the common market or 
in a  substantial  part of  it ; 
(16)  Whereas the  Commission should have  the  task  of 
taking  all  the  decisions  necessary  to  establish 
whether or not concentrations with  a Community 
dimension  are  compatible  .with  the  common 
market,  as  well  as  decisions  designed  to  restore 
effective  competition ; 
(17)  Whereas  to  ensure  effective  control  undertakings 
should  be  obliged  to  give  prior  notification  of 
concentrations with  a  Community dimension  and 
provision  should  be  made  for  the  suspension  of 
concentrations  for  a  limited  period,  and  for  the 
possibility  of  extending  or  waiving  a  suspension 
where  necessary; whereas  in  the  interests  of  legal 
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certainty the validity of transactions must neverthe-
less  be  protected  as  much  as  necessary ; 
(18)  Whereas  a  period  within  which the  Commission 
must  initiate  proceedings  in  respect  of  a  notified 
concent~tion  and  periods  within  which  it  must 
give a final decision on the compatibility or incom-
patibility  with  the  common  market  of  a  notified 
concentration  should  be  laid  down ; 
(19)  Whereas  the  undertakings  concerned  must  be 
afforded  the  right to  be  heard by  the Commission 
when proceedings have  been initiated ; whereas the 
members  of  the  management  and  supervisory 
bodies  and  the  recognized  representatives  of  the 
employees  of  the  undertakings  concerned,  and 
third  parties  showing  a  legitimate  interest,  must 
also  be  given  the  opportunity  to  be  heard ; 
(20).  Whereas  the  Commission should  act  in  close  and 
constant liaison  with  the  competent authorities  of 
the  Member  States  from  which  it  obtains 
comments  and  information ; 
(21)  Whereas,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Regulation,  and 
in  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  the  Commission  must  be  afforded  the 
assistance  of  the  Member States  and  must also  be 
empowered to  require information to  be given  and 
to carry out the necessary investigations in order to 
appraise  concentrations ; 
(22)  Whereas compliance with  this  Regulation  must be 
enforceable by  means of  fines and periodic penalty 
payments ; whereas  the  Court of Justice should be 
given unlimited jurisdiction in that regard pursuant 
to  Article  172  of  the  Treaty; 
(23)  Whereas  it  is  appropriate to  define the concept of 
concentration  in  such  a  manner as  to  cover  only 
operations  bringing about a  lasting change. in  the 
structure of the undertakings concerned ; whereas it 
is  therefore necessary to exclude from  the scope of 
this  Regulation  those  operations  which  have  as 
their  object  or  effect  the  coordination  of  the 
competitive  behaviour  of  undertakings  which 
remain  independent, since  such  operations  fall  to 
be  examined  under  the  appropriate  provisions  of 
the  Regulations  implementing Articles  85  and 86 
of  the  Treaty ; whereas  it  is  appropriate  to  make 
this  distinction  specifically  in  the  case  of  the 
creation  of  joint  ventures ; 
(24)  Whereas  there  is  no  coordination  of  competitive 
behaviour  within  the  meaning  of  this  Regulation 
where  two  or  more  undertakings  agree  to  acquire 
jointly control  of  one  or more other undertakings 
with  the  object  and  effect  of  sharing  amongst 
themselves  such  undertakings  or  their  assets ; (25)  Whereas  this  Regulation  should  still  apply  where 
the  undertakings  concerned  accept  · restrictions 
directly  related  and  necessary  to  the  implementa-
tion  of  the  concentration ; 
(26)  Whereas the Commission should be given exclus-
ive competence to  apply this Regulation, subject to 
review  by  the  Court  of  Justice ; 
(27)  Whereas  the  Member  States  may  not  apply  their 
national  legislation  on  competition  to  concentra-
tions  with  a  Community  dimension,  unless  this 
Regulation  makes  provision  therefor ; whereas  the 
relevant  powers  of  national  authorities  should  be 
limited to  cases  where,  failing  intervention by the 
Commission,  effective  competition  is  likely  to  be 
significantly  impeded  within  the  territory  of  a 
Member State  and where the competition interests 
of  that  Member  State  cannot  be  sufficiently 
protected  otherwise  by  this  Regulation ;  whereas 
the Member States concerned must act promptly in 
such  cases ;  whereas  this  Regulation  cannot, 
because of the diversity of national law, fix  a single 
deadline  for  the  adoption  of  remedies ; 
(28)  Whereas, furthermore,  the  exclusive  application  of 
this  Regulation  to  concentrations with  a  Commu-
nity dimension is  without prejudice to Article 223 
of  the  Treaty,  and  does  not  prevent  the  Member 
States  from  taking appropriate measures to  protect 
legitimate  interests  other  than  those  pursued  by 
this  Regulation,  provided  thar such  measures  are 
compatible  with  the general  principles  and  other 
provisions  of Community law ; 
(29)  Whereas concentrations not covered  by this Regu-
lation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of 
the  Member  States ;  whereas,  however,  the 
Commission  should have  the  power to  act,  at  the 
request  of  a  Member  State  concerned,  in  cases 
where effective  competition  could  be significantly 
impeded within  that  Member  State's  territory; 
(30)  Whereas  the  conditions  in  which  concentrations 
involving Community undertakings are  carried out 
in  non-member countries should be observed,  and 
provision should be made for  the possibility of the 
Council  giving  the  Commission  an  appropriate 
mandate  for·  negotiation  with  a  view  to  obtaining 
non-discriminatory  ~reatment  for  Community 
undertakings ; 
(31)  Whereas  this  Regulation  in  no way  detracts  from 
the collective rights of employees as  recognized  in 
the  undertakings  concerned, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION : 
Article  1 
Scope 
I.  Without prejudice to Article 22 this Regulation shall 
apply to all  concentrations with a Community dimension 
as  defined  in  paragraph  2. 
2.  For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration 
has  a  Community dimension  where : 
(a)  the combined aggregate worldwide turnover  ~f all  the 
undertakings  concerned  is  more  than  ECU  5 000 
million ;  and 
(b)  the aggregate  Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is  more than 
ECU  250  million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover 
within  one  and  the  same  Member State. 
3.  The. thresholds  laid  down  in  paragraph  2  will  be 
reviewed before  the end of the fourth year following  that 
of the adoption of  this Regulation by  the Council acting 
by  a qualified majority on a proposal from  the Commis-
sion. 
Article  2 
Appraisal of concentrations 
I.  Concentrations within  the scope of  this  Regulation 
shall be appraised in accordance with the following provi-
sions with a view  to establishing whether or not they are 
compatible  with  the  common  market. 
In  making this appraisal, the Commission shall take  into 
account: 
(a)  the  need  to  maintain  and develop  effective  competi-
1  tion  within  the common  market  in view  of,  among 
other  things,  the  structure  of  · all  the  markets 
concerned  and  the  actual  or  potential  competition 
from  undertakings  located  either  within  or  outwith 
the  Community; 
(b)  the  market  position  of  the  undertakings  concerned 
and  their economic and financial  power,  the alterna-
tives  available  to  suppliers and  users,  their access  to 
supplies  or  markets,  any  legal  or  other  barriers  to 
entry,  supply  and  demand  trends  for  the  relevant 
goods  and  services,  the interests  of  the  interniediate 
and· ultimate  consumers,  and  the  development  of 
technical and economic progress provided that it is  to 
consumers' advantage  and does  not form  an obstacle 
to  competition. 
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a dominant position as  a result of which effective compe-
tition  would  be  significantly  impeded  in  the  common 
market  or  in  a  substantial  part' of  it  shall  be  declared 
compatible  with  the  common  market. 
3.  A  concentration  which  creates  or  strengthens  a 
dominant position  as  a result of which effective competi-
tion  would  be  significantly  impeded  in  the  common 
market  or  in  a  substantial  part  of  it  shall  be  declared 
incompatible  with  the  common  market. 
Article 3 
Definition of concentration 
I.  A  concentration  shall  be  deemed  to  arise  where : 
(a)  two  or  more  previously  independent  undertakings 
merge, .or 
(b)  - one  or  more  persons· already  controlling at  least 
one  undertaking,  or 
·_ one  or  more  undertakings 
acquire,  whether  by  purchase  of  securities  or assets,  by 
contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control 
of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 
2.  An  operation,  including  the  creation  of  a  joint 
venture, which has as  its object or effect the coordination 
of  the  competitive  behaviour  of  undertakings  which 
remain  independent shall  not constitute a concentration 
within  the  meaning of  paragraph  I  (b). 
The creation  of  a  joint venture  performing on  a  lasting 
basis all  the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
which does  not give  rise  to  coordination of the competi-
tive  behaviour  of  the  parties  amongst  themselves  or 
between  them  and  the  joint  venture,  shall  constitute  a 
concentration  within  the  meaning of  paragraph  I  (b). 
3.  For the purposes of this Regulation, control shall be 
constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, 
either separately or in  combination and  having regard  to 
the  considerations  of  fact  or  law  involved,  confer  the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on an underta-
king,  in  particular  by : 
(a)  ownership or the  right to  use  all  or part of the assets 
of  an  undertaking; 
(b)  rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on 
the composition, voting or decisions  of the organs of 
an  undertaking. 
4.  Control  is  acquired  by  persons  or  undertakings 
which: 
(a)  are  holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the 
contracts  concerned ; or 
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(b)  while  not being holders of such  rights  or entitled  to 
rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise 
the  rights  deriving  therefrom. 
5.  A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where : 
(a)  credit  institutions  or  other  financial  institutions  or 
insurance  companies,  the  normal activities  of  which 
include transactions and dealing in securities for  their 
own  account or for  the  account of others,  hold  on  a 
temporary basis securities which they have acquired in 
an  undertaking  with  a  view  to  reselling  them, 
provided  that  they  do  not  exercise  voting  rights  in 
respect of those securities with  a view  to determining 
the  competitive  behaviour  of  that  undertaking  or 
provided  that  they  exercise  such  voting  rights  only 
with a view to  preparing the disposal  of all  or part of 
that  undertaking  or  of  its  assets  or  the  disposal  of 
those securities arid that any such disposal takes  place 
within one year of the date of acquisition ; that period 
may  be  extended  by  the.· Commission  on  request 
where  such  institutions or companies can  show  that 
the  disposal  was  not  reasonably  possible  within  the 
period  set; 
(b)  control  is  acquired  by  an  office-holder  according  to 
the  law  of  a  Member  State  relating  to  liquidation, 
winding  up,  insolvency,  cessation  of  payments, 
compositions' or analogous  proceedings ; 
.(c)  the operations. referred to· in paragraph I (b) are carried 
out by  the financial  holding companies referred  to in 
Article  5  (3)  of  the  Fourth  Council  Directive 
78/660/EEC of 25  July 1978  on the annual  accounts 
of certain  types  of  companies ('),  as  last  amended  by 
Directive  84/569/EEC ('),  provided  however  that  the 
voting· rights  in  respect  of the  holding are  exercised, 
in  particular  in  relation  to  the  appointment  of 
members  of  the  management and supervisory  bodies 
of the undertakings in which they have holdings, only 
to  maintain  the  full  value  of  those  investments  and 
not to  determine directly or indirectly the competitive 
conduct  of  those  undertakings. 
Article  4 
Prior notification of concentrations 
I.  Concentrations  with  a  Community  dimension 
defined  in  this  Regulation  shall  be  notified  to  the 
Commission  not  more  than  one week  after  the  conclu-
sion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public 
bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. That week 
shall  begin  when  the  first  of  those  events  occurs. 
2.  A concentration which  consists of a  merge~ within 
the  meaning of  Article  3 (I) (a)  or in  the  acquisition  of 
joint control within the meaning of Article  3 (I) (b)  shall 
be notified jointly by the parties to the merger or by those 
acquiring  joint  control  as  the  case  may  be.  In  all  other 
cases,  the  notification  shall  be effected  by  the  person  or 
undertaking  acquiring  control  of  the  whole  or  parts  of 
one  or  more  undertakings. 
(')  OJ  No  L 222,  14.  8.  1978,  p.  II. 
(')  OJ  No  L 314,  4.  12.  1984,  p.  28. 3.  Where  the  Commission  finds  that  a  notified 
concentration· falls  within the scope of this Regulation, it 
shall publish the fact of the notification, at the same  time 
indicating  the  names  of  the  parties,  the  nature  of  the 
concentration  and  the  economic  sectors  involved.  The 
Commission shall take account of the legitimate interest 
of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
Article  5 
Calculation of turnover 
I.  Aggregate  turnover within the meaning of Article  I 
(2)  shall  comprise  the  amounts  derived  by  the  under-
takings  concerned  in  the  preceding financial  year from 
the sale  of products and  the provision  of services  falling 
within  the  undertakings'  ordinary activities  after  deduc-
tion  of  sales  rebates  and  of  value  added  tax  and  other. 
taxes  directly related  to  turnover. The aggregate  turnover 
of an  undertaking concerned shall not include the sale  of 
products or the provision  of services  between any  of  the 
undertakings  referred  to  in  paragraph  4. 
Turnover, in the Community or in a Member State,  shall 
comprise  products  sold  and  services  provided  to  under-
takings  or  consumers,  in  the  Community  or  in  that 
Member  State  as  the  case  may  be. 
2.  By  way  of derogation  from  paragraph  I,  where  the 
concentration consists in the acquisition of parts, whether 
or not constituted as  legal entities, of one or more under-
takings, only the  turnover relating to  the  parts which  are 
the subject of the transaction shall be taken into account 
with  regard  to  the .seller  or  sellers. 
However, tWo or more transactions within the meaning of 
the first subparagraph which take  place within a two-year 
period between the same persons or undertakings shall be 
treated as  one and the same concentration arisin.g on the 
date  of  the  last  transaction. 
3.  In  place  of  turnover  the  following  shall  be  used : 
(a)  for  credit institutions and other financial  institutions, 
as  regards  Article  1  (2)  (a),  one-tenth  of  their  total 
assets. 
As regards Article  I (2) (b) and the final part of Article 
I  (2),  total  Community-wide  turnover  shall  be 
replaced by one-tenth of total assets multiplied by the 
ratio between loans and advances to credit institutions 
and customers in transactions  with  Community resi-
dents and the total sum of those loans and advances. 
As regards the final  part of Article  I (2), total turnover 
within  one Member  State  shall  be  replaced  by  one-
tenth  of  total  assets  multiplied by  the  ratio  between 
loans  and  advances  to  credit  institutions  and  custo-
mers  in  transactions  with  residents  of  that Member 
State and the total sum of those loans and advances ; 
(b)  for  insurance  undertakings,  the  value  of  gross 
premiums  written  which  shall  comprise  all  amounts 
received  and  receivable  in  respect  of  insurance 
contracts  issued  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  insurance 
undertakings,  including  also  outgoing  reinsurance 
premiums, and after deduction of taxes  and parafiscal 
contributions  or  levies  charged  by  reference  to  the 
amounts  of  individual  premiums or the  total volume 
of premiums ; as  regards ·Article  I (2) (b) and the final 
part  of  Article  I  (2),  gross  premiums  received  from 
Community  residents  and  from  residents  of  one 
Member State respectively shall be taken into account. 
4.  Without  prejudice  to  paragraph  2, •  the  aggregate 
turnover  of  an·  undertaking  concerned·  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  I  (2)  shall  be  calculated  by' adding 
together  the . respective  turnovers  of  the  following : 
(a) .  the undertaking  concerned ; 
(b)  those  undertakings  in  which  the  undertaking 
concerned,  directly  or indirectly : 
- owns more than half the capital or business assets, 
or 
- has  the  power  to  exercise  more  than  half  the 
voting  rights,  or 
- has  the  power  to  appoint  more  than  half  the 
members of the supervisory board, the. administra-
tive  board  or  bodies  legally  representing  the 
undertakings,  or 
- has the right to manage the undertaki-ngs' affairs ; 
(c)  those  undertakings  :which  have  in  the  undertaking 
concerned  the  rights  or  powers  listed  in· (b); 
(d)  those  undertakings  in  which  an  undertaking  as 
referred to  in (c)  has the rights or powers listed in (b); 
(e)  those  undertakings  in  which  two  or  more . underta, 
kings as  referred  to in (a)  to (d)  jointly have  the rights 
or powers  listed  in  (b). 
5.  Where undertakings concerned by the concentration 
jointly have  the rights or powers  listed in paragraph 4 (b), 
in  calculating the· aggregate  turnover of  the undertakings 
concerned  for  the  purposes  of  Article  I  (2) : 
(a)  no· account  shall  be  taken  of  the  turnover  resulting 
from  the sale  of  products or the provision  of  services 
between the joint undertaking and each of the under-
. takings  concerned  or  any  other  undertaking 
connected with  any one  of  them,. as  set  out in  para-
graph 4  (b)  to  (e); 
(b)  account shall  be  taken  of the  turnover resulting from 
the  sale  of  products  and  the  provision  of  services 
between  the  joint undertaking  and  any  third  under-
takings.  This  turnover  shall  be  apportioned  equally 
amongst  the  undertakings  concerned. 
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Examination  of the  notification  and  initiation .of 
proceedings · 
in  order to prevent serious damage  to. one or more under-
takings  concerned by a concentration or to  a third  party. 
That derogation  may  be  made  subject  to  conditions arid 
obligations  in  order  to  ensure  .conditions  of  effective 
competition. A derogation may be applied for and granted 
at  any time, even' before  notification or after the transac-
t.  The  Commission  shall  examine  the  notification  as  tion. 
soon  as  it  is  received. 
(a)  Where  it  concludes  that  the  concentration  notified 
does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  Regulation,  it 
shall  record  that finding  by  means  of  a  decision. 
(b)  Where  it  finds  that  ·the  concentration  notified, 
although  falling  within  the scope  of  this  Regulation, 
does  not  raise  serious  doubts  as  to  its  compatibility 
with  the  common  market,  it  shall  decide  not  to 
oppose it and shall declare that it is  compatible with 
the  common ·market. 
(c)  H,  on the other hand, it finds  that the concentration 
notified falls  within the scope  of  this  Regulation  and 
raises  serious  doubts  as  to  its  compatibility with  the 
· common  market,  it  shall  decide  to  initiate  procee-
dings. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  notify  its  decision  to  the 
undertakings concerned and the competent authorities of 
the  Member States  without  delay. 
Article  7 
Suspension of concentrations 
I.  For the purposes of paragraph  2 a concentration  as 
defined  in  Article  I  shall  not  be  put into  effect  either 
before its notification or within the first three weeks folio· 
wing  its  notification. 
2.  Where  the  Commission,  following  a  preliminary 
examination  of  the  notification  within  the  period 
provided for  in  paragraph  I, finds  it necessary in  order to 
ensure  the  full  effectiveness  of  any  decision  taken  later 
pursuant to Article 8 (3) and (4), it may decide on its own 
initiative to continue the suspension of a concentration in 
whole  or in  part until it ~akes a final  decision, or to take 
other  interim  measures  to  that effect. 
3.  Paragraphs  I and 2 shall not prevent the implemen-
tation  of  a  public  bid  which  has  been  notified  to  the 
Commission  in  accordance  with  Article  4  (I),  provided 
that  the  acquirer  does  not  exercise  the  voting  rights 
attached  to  the securities  in  question or does  so  only  to 
maintain  the  full  value  of  those  investments  and  on the 
basis  of  a derogation  granted by  the  Commission  under 
paragraph  4.  · 
4.  The  Commission  may,  on  request,  grant a deroga· 
tion from  the obligations imposed in paragraphs  I, 2 or 3 
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5.  The validity of any transaction carried out in contra· 
vention of paragraph  I or 2 shall be dependent on a deci-
sion  pursuant to  Article 6 (I) (b)  or Artide 8 (2)  or (3)  or 
on  a  presumption  pursuant  to  Article  I 0  (6). 
This Article shall, however,  have  no effect on the validity 
of  transactions  in  securities  including  those  convertible 
into  other  securities  admitted  to  trading  on  a  market 
which  is  regulated  and  supervised. by  authorities  recog-
nized  by  public  bodies,  operates  regularly  and  is  acces-
sible directly or indirectly to  the public, unless the buyer 
and seller knew or ought to  have  known that the transac-
tion was  carried out in  cont~vention of paragraph  I or 2. 
Article  8 
Powers ·of decision of the Commission . 
I.  Without  prejudice  to  Article  9,  all  proceedings 
initiated _pursuant  to  Article  6 (I)  (c)  shall  be  closed  by 
means of a decision as  provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5. 
2.  Where the Commission finds that, following modifi-
cation by the undertakings concerned if  necessary, a noti-
fied  concentration  fulfils  the  criterion  laid·  down  in 
Article  2  (2),  it  shall  issue  a decision  declaring  the 
concentration  compatible  with  the  common  market. 
It may  attach  to  its  decision  conditions  and  obligations 
intended  to  ensure  that  the  undertakings  concerned 
comply  with  the  commitments  they  have  entered  into 
vis·a·vis  the  Commission  with  a  view  to  modifying  the 
original  concentration  plan.  The  decision  declaring  the 
concentration  compatible  shall  also  cover  restrictions 
directly  related  and  necessary  to  the  implementation  of 
the  concentration. 
3.  Where  the  Commission  finds  that  a concentration 
fulfils the criterion laid down  in Article 2 (3), it shall issue 
a  decision  declaring  that  the  concentration  is  incompa-
tible  with  the  common  market. 
4.  Where  a  concentration  has  already  been  imple-
mented, the Commission  may,  in a decision  pursuant to 
paragraph 3 or by  separate decision, require  the  underta-
kings  or assets  brought  together  to  be  separated  or  the 
cessation of  joint control or any other action  that may be 
appropriate  in  order  to  restore  conditions  of  effective 
competition. 5.  The  Commission  may  revoke  the  decision  it  has 
taken  pursuant  to  paragraph  2 where : 
(a)  the  declaration  of  compatibility is  based  on incorrect 
information  for  which  one  of  the  undertakings  is 
responsible or where it  has  been  obtained by deceit ; 
or 
(b)  the  undertakings  concerned  commit a  breach  of  an 
obligation  attached  to  the  decision. 
6.  In the cases referred to in paragraph 5, the Commis-
sion  may  take  a  decision  under  paragraph  3,  without 
being bound by the deadline referred to in Article 10 (3). 
Article  9 
Referral  to  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
Member States 
1.  The Commission may, by means of a decision  noti-
fied without delay to the undertakings concerned and the 
competent authorities of the other Member States,  refer a 
notified concentration to the competent authorities of the 
Member State concerned in the following circumstances. 
2.  Within  three  weeks  of  the  date  of  receipt  of  the 
copy of the  notification a Member State  may inform  the 
Commission,  which  shall  inform  the · undertakings 
concerned, that a concentration  threatens  to  create or to 
strengthen a dominant position as a res11lt of which effec-
tive  competition  would  be  significantly  impeded  on  a 
market, within that Member State, which presents all .the 
characteristics of a destinct market, be it a substantial part 
of  the  common  market  or not. 
3.  If the Commission  considers. that, having regard  to 
the market for  the products  or  services  in  question  and 
the geographical reference market within the  meaning of 
paragraph 7,  there is such a distinct market and that· such 
a  threat  exists,  either : 
(a)  it shall itself deal with the case in order to maintain or 
restore  effective  competition  on  the  market 
concerned ;  or 
(b)  it  shall refer the case  to  the competent authorities of 
the Member State concerned with a view to  the appli-
cation  of  that State's  national  competition  law. 
If,  however,  the  Commission  considers  that  such  a 
distinCt  market or threat  does  not  e~ist it  shall  adopt a 
decision  to  that  effect  wh~ch  it  shall  address  to  the . 
Member State  concerned  .. 
4.  A decision to  refer  or not to  refer  pursuant to  para-
graph  3  shall  be  taken :  · 
(a)  as  a general rule within the six-week  period provided 
for  in  Article  10  (1 ),  second subparagraph, where  the 
Commission,  pursuant  to  Article  6  (1)  (b),  has  not 
initiated  proceedings ; or 
(b)  within three months at most of the notification of the 
concentration  concerned where  the  Commission  has 
initiated  proceedings  under Article  6 (I) (c),  without 
taking  the  preparatory  steps  in  order  to  adopt  the 
necessary measures under Article 8 (2),  second subpa-
ragraph,  (3)  or  (4)  to  maintain  or  restore  effective 
competition  on  the  market  concerned. 
~·  If within the three months referred  to  in  paragraph 
4  (b)  the  Commission,  despite  a  reminder  from  the  · 
Member  State  concerned,  has  not  taken  a  decision  on 
referral  in accordance with paragraph 3 nor has taken the· 
preparatory steps referred to  in paragraph 4 (b), it shall be 
deemed to  have  taken a decision  to  refer· the case  to  the 
Member State  concerned in accordance with· paragraph 3 
(b). 
6.  The publication of any report or the announcement 
of  the  findings  of the el!amination  of  the  concentration 
by  the  competen.t  authority  of  the  Member  State 
concerned shall be  effected  not more  than four  months 
after 'the  Commission's  referral. 
7.  The geographical  reference  market shall  consist  of 
the  area  in  which  the  undertakings  concerned  are 
involved  in  the  supply  and  demand  of  products  or 
services, in which the conditions of competition are  suffi-
ciently  homogeneous  and  which  can  be  distinguished 
from  neighbouring areas because, in particular, conditions 
of  competition  are  appreciably  different  in  those  areas. 
This assessment should take  account in  particular of the 
nature  and  characteristics  of  the  products  or  services 
. concerned,  of  the  existence  of  entry  barriers  of  of 
consumer  preferences,  of  appreciable  differences  of  the 
undertakings'  market shares  between  the  area  concerned 
and neighbouring areas or of substantial price differences. 
8.  In  applying  the  provisions  of  this  Article,  the 
Member  State  concerned  may  take  only  the  measures 
strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective competi-
tion  on  the  market  concerned. 
9.  In  accordance  with  the  relevant  prov1s1ons  of  the 
Treaty,  any  Member  State  may appeal  to  the  Court  of 
Justice, and in particular request the application of Article ' 
186,  for  the purpose of applying its national competition 
law. 
· I 0.  This Article will be  reviewed before the end of the 
·fourth year following that of the adoption ofthis Regula-
tion. 
Article  10 
Time  limits  for  initiating  proceedings  and  for 
decisions 
1.  The  decisions  referred  to  in Article  6  (1)  must  be· 
taken within one month at most. That period shall begin 
on the day  following  that of  the receipt of  a notification 
or, if the information to be supplied with the notification 
is incomplete, on the day following  that of the receipt of 
the  complete  information. 
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Commission  receives  a  request  from  a  Member State  in 
accordance  with  Article  9  (2). 
2.  Decisions taken pursuant to Article 8 (2)  concerning 
notified  concentrations  must  be  taken  as  soon  as  it 
appears that the serious doubts referred to in Article 6 (I) 
(c)  have been removed, particularly as a result of modifica-
tions  made  by  the  undertakings  concerned,  and  at  the 
latest  by  the deadline ·laid  down  in  paragraph  3. 
3.  Without prejudice  to  Article  8  (6),  decisions  taken 
pursuant to Article  8  (3)  concerning notified  concentra-
tions must be taken within not more than four months of 
the  date  on which  proceedings  are  initiated. 
4.  The period set by paragraph 3 shall exceptionally be 
suspended wh-ere,  owing to  circumstances for  which one 
of  the  undertakings · involved  in  the·  concentration  is 
responsible, the Commission has had to  request informa-
tion  by  decision  pursuant  to  Article  II  or to  order  an 
investigation  by decision  pursuant  to  Article  13. 
5.  Where  the  Court  of  Justice  gives  a  Judgement 
which annuls the whole or part of a Commission decision 
taken under this Regulation, the periods• laid down in this 
Regulation  shall start again  from  the date  of  the Judge-
ment. 
6.  Where the Commission has  not taken a decision in 
accordance with Article 6 (I) (b)  or (c)  or Article 8 (2)  or 
(3)  within the deadlines set in paragraphs I  and 3 respec-
tively,  the  concentration  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been 
declared  compatible  with  the  common  market,  without 
prejudice  to  Article  9. 
Article  11 
Requests  for information 
I.  In  carrying  out  the  duties  assigned  to  it  by  this 
Regulation,  the  Commission  may  obtain  all  necessary 
information from  the Governments and comptent autho-
rities  of  the  Member States,  from  the persons referred  to· 
in  Article  3  (I) (b),  and  from  undertakings  and  associa-
tions  of  undertakings. 
2.  When sending a request for information to a person, 
an  undertaking  or  an  association  of  undertakings,  the 
Commission  shall  at the same  time  send a  copy  <if  the 
request  to  the competent authority of  the Member State 
within the territory of which the residence of  the person . 
or the seat of the undertaking or association  of underta-
kings  is  situated. 
3.  In  its  request the Commission shall  state  the  legal 
basis· and the purpose of the request and also the penalties 
provided  for  in  Article  14 (I) (c)  for  supplying incorrect 
information. 
4.  The information  requested shall  be provided, in  the 
case of undertakings, by their owners oi their representa-
tives and, in the case of legal  persons, companies or firms, 
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,  or  of  associatiOns  having  no  legal  personality,  by  the 
persons authorized to  represent them by law  or by  their 
statutes. 
5.  Where a person, an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings does  not provide the information requested 
within  the  period  fixed  by  the Commission  or provides 
incomplete  information, the  Commission  shall  by  deci-
sion require the information to be provided. The decision 
shall specify what information is  required, fix  an'  appro-
priate period  within which it is  to be supplied and state 
the penalties provided for  in Articles  14  (1)  (c) and 15 (I) 
(a)  and  the  right  to  have  the  decision  reviewed  by  the 
Court of  Justice. 
6.  The Commission shall at the same time send a copy 
of its  decision  to  the competent authority of the Member 
State  within  the  territory  of  which  the  residence  of  the 
person  or the  seat  of  the  undertaking  or association  of 
undertakings  is  situated. 
Article  12 
Investigations  by  the  authorities  of  the  Member 
States 
I.  At  the  request of  the  Commission, ,the  competent 
authorities  of  the  Member  States  shall  undertake  the 
investigations  which  the  Commission  considers  to  be 
necessary under Article 13  (I), or which it has ordered by 
decision  pursuant  to  Article  13  (3).  The  officials  of  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  Member States  responsible 
for  conducting  those  investigations  shall  exercise  their 
powers  upon  production  of  an  authorization  in  writing 
issued  by  the  competent authority  of  the  Member State 
within  the  territory  of  which. the  investigation  is  to  be 
carried  out.  Such  authorization  shall  specify  the  subject 
matter and  purpose  of  the  investigation. 
2.  If  so  requested  by  the  Commission  or· by  the 
competent authority of the Member State within the terri-
tory of which  the  investigation  is  to  be  carried out, offi-
cials  of  the  Commission  may  assist  the officials  of  that 
authority  iri  carrying  out their  duties.  · 
Article  13 
Investigative  powers of the Commission 
I.  In  carrying  out  the  duties  assigned  to  it  by  this 
Regulation, the Commission may  undertake all  necessary . 
investigations  into  undertakings  and  associations  of 
undertakings. 
To that  end  the officials  authorized  by  the  Commission 
shall  be  empowered : 
(a)  to  examine  the  books  and  other  business  records ; 
(b)  to  take  or  demand  copies  of  or  extracts  from  the 
books  and  business  records ; (c)  to  ask  for  oral  explanations  on  the  spot; 
(d)  to· enter any premises, land and means of transport of 
undertakings. 
2.  The officials of the Commission authorized to carry 
out  the  investigations  shall  exercise  their  powers  on 
production of  an  authorization  in  writing specifying the 
subject  matter and purpose  of  the  investigation  and the 
penalties provided for in Article  14 (I) (d)  in cases where 
production  of  the  required  books  or  other  business 
records is incomplete. In good time before the investiga-
tion, the Commission shall inform, in writing, the compe-
tent authority of  the Member State within the territory of 
which the investigation is  to be carried out of the investi-
gation  and  of  the  identities  of  the  authorized  officials. 
3.  Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall 
submit  to  investigations  ordered  by  decision  of  the 
Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter 
and  purpose  of  the  investigation, . appoint  the  date  on 
which  it shall begin and state the penalties provided for 
in Articles 14 (1)  (d)  and 15 (I) (b)  and the right to  have 
the  decision  reviewed  by  the  Court of Justice. 
4.  The Commission shall in good time and in writing 
inform  the  competent  authority  of  the  Member  State 
within  the  territory  of  which  the  investigation  is  to  be 
carried out of its intention of taking a decision  pursuant 
to  paragraph  3.  It  shall  hear  the  competent  authority 
before  taking  its  decision. 
5.  Officials of the competent authority of the Member 
State within the territory of which the investigation is  to 
be carried out may, at  the request of that authority or of 
the Commission, assist the officials of the Commission in 
carrying out  their duties. 
6.  Where  an  undertaking  or  assoctatton  of  under-
takings opposes an investigation ordered pursuant to this 
Article,  the  Member  State  concerned  shall  afford  the 
necessary  assistance  to  the  officials  authorized  by  the 
Commission to enable them to carry out their investiga- • 
tion. To this end the Member States shall, after consulting 
the Commission, take  the necessary measures within one 
year  of  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Regulation. 
Arti~le 14 
Fines 
I.  The  Commission  may  by decision  impose  on  the 
persons  referred  to  in  Article  3  (I) (b),  undertakings  or 
associations of undertakings fines  of  from  ECU  I 000 to 
50 000  where  intentionally or negligently : 
(a)  they fail  to  notify a concentration in accordance with 
Article  4; 
(b)  they supply. incorrect or misleading information in  a 
notification  pursuant  to  Article  4 ; 
(c)  they  supply  inqprrect  information  in  response  to  a 
request made pursuant to Article  II or fail  to supply 
information  within  the  period  fixed by  a  decision 
taken  pursuant to  Article  11  ; 
(d)  they  produce  the  required  books  or other business 
records  in  incomplete  form  during  investigations 
under  Article  12  or  13,  or  refuse  to  submit  to  an 
investigation  ordered  by decision  taken  pursuant  to 
Article  13. 
2.  The Commission may by decision impose fines not 
exceeding  I  0 % of the aggregate  turnover of  the  under-
takings concerned within the meaning of Article 5 on the 
persons  or undertakings  concerned  where,  either  inten-
tionally  or  negligently;  they : 
(a)  fail  to comply with an obligation imposed by decision 
pursuant  to  Article .  7  (4)  or  8. (2),  second  subpara-
graph;  · 
(b)  put into effect a concentration in breach of  Article 7 
(I) or disregard a  decision taken  pursuant to Article 7 
(2); 
(c)  put into effect a concentration declared  incompatible 
with  the  common  market  by  decision  pursuant  to 
Article 8 (3)  or do  not take  the  measures ordered  by 
decision  pursuant  to  Article  8  (4). 
3.  In setting the amount of  a fine, regard shall be had 
to  the  nature  and  gravity  of the infringement. 
4.  Decisions  taken  pursuant  to  paragraphs  1  and  2 
shall  not be  of  criminal  law  nature. 
Article 15 · 
Periodic penalty payments 
I.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  on  the 
persons  referred  to  in  Article  3 (I) (b),  undertakings  or 
associations  of undertakings  concerned  periodic  penalty 
payments  of  up  to  ECU  25 000  for  each  day  of  delay 
calculated  from  the date  set  in the  decision, in  order to 
compel  them : 
(a)  to supply complete  and correct  information which it 
has  requested  by  decision  pursuant  to  Article  II ; 
(b)  to submit to  an investigation which it has  ordered by 
decision  pursuant  to  Article  13. 
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persons referred to  iri  Article 3 (I) (b)  or on undertakings 
periodic penalty payments of up to ECU I 00 000 for each 
day of delay calculated from  the date set in  the decision, 
in  order  to  compel  them : 
(a)  to  comply  with  an  obligation  imposed  by  decision 
pursuant to  Article  7 (4) or Article 8 (2),  second sub-
paragraph,  or 
(b)  to apply the "measures ordered by decision pursuant to 
Article  8  (4). 
3.  Where  the  persons  referred  to  in  Article  3  (I)  (b), 
undertakings or associations of undertakings have satisfied 
the  obligation  which  it was  the  purpose  of  the  periodic 
penalty payment to enforce, the Commission may set the 
total  amount of the  periodic penalty payments at a lower 
figure  than  that  which  would  arise  under  the  original 
decision. 
Article  16 
Review by the Court of·  Justice 
The  Court  of  Justice  shall  have  unlimited  jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article  172 of the Treaty to review 
decisions  whereby  the  Commission  has  fixed  a  fine  or 
periodic  penalty  payments ;  it  may  cancel,  reduce  or 
increase the fine or periodic penalty payments imposed. 
Article  17 
Professional secrecy 
I.  Information acquired ~s a result of the application of 
Article  II,  12,  13  and  18  shall  be  used  only  for  the 
purposes of the relevant request, investigation or hearing. 
2.  Without prejudice  to  Articles  4 (3),  18  and  20,  the 
Commission  and  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
Member States,  their officials and other servants shall not 
disclose  information  they  have  acquired  through  the 
application of this  Regulation of the kind covered by the 
obligation  of  professional  secrecy. 
3.  Paragraphs  I and  2 shall  not prevent publication of 
general  information  or of surveys  which  do not contain 
information relating to  particular undertakings or associa-
. tions  of  undertakings. 
Article  18 
Hearing of the parties and of third persons 
I.  Before taking any decision provided for in Articles 7 
(2)  and {4),  Article 8 {2),  second subparagraph, and  (3)  to 
{5) and Articles 14 and 15, the Commission shall give  the 
persons,  undertakings  and  associations  of  undertakings 
concerned the opportunity, at every stage of the procedure 
up  to  the  consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee,  of 
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making  known  their  views  on  the  objections  against 
them. 
2.  By  way  of  derogation  from  paragraph  I, a .  decision 
to continue the suspension of a concentration or to grant 
a  derogation  from  suspension  as  referred  to  in Article  7 
(2) or (4)  may be taken provisionally, without the persons, 
undertakings  or  associations  of  undertakings  concerned 
being given  the  opportunity to  make  known  their views 
beforehand,  provided  that  the  Commission  gives·  them 
that opportunity as .soon as  possible after having taken  its 
decision. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  base  its  decision  only  on 
objections on which the parties have  been able to submit 
their observations. The rights of the defence shall be fully 
respected  in  the  proceedings. Access  to  the  file  shall  be 
open at least to the parties directly involved, subject to the 
legitimate  interest  of  undertakings  in  the  protection  of 
their  business  secrets. 
4.  In  so  far  as  the  Commission  or  the  competent 
authorities of the Member States  deem  it  necessary,  they 
may  also  hear  other natural  or  legal  persons.  Natural  or 
legal  persons showing a sufficient  interest and  especially 
members of  the  administrative or  management bodies  of 
the undertakings concerned or the recognized representa-
tives  of  their employees  shall  be  entitled, upon  applica-
tion,  to  be  heard. 
Article  19 
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States 
I.  The  Commission  shall  transmit  to  the  competent 
authorities  of  the  Member  Suites  copies  of  notifications 
within three working days and, as soon as  possible, copies 
of  the  most  important documents  lodged  with  or issued · 
by  the  Commission  pursuant to  this  Regulation. 
2.  The Commission shall  carry  out the  procedures set 
out in  this Regulation  in  close and constant liaison  with 
the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States,  which 
may.  express  their views  upon  those  procedures.  For  the 
purposes of Article 9 it shall obtain information from  the 
competent authority of the Member State as  referred to in 
paragraph  2 of  that Article and give  it the opportunity to 
make  known  its  views  at every stage of the  procedure up 
to  the adoption  of a decision  pursuant to  paragraph 3 of 
that Article ; to that end it shall give it access to the file. 
3.  An  Advisory  Committee on concentrations shall  be 
consulted before any decision is  taken pursuant to Article 
8  (2)  to  (  5),  14  or  15,  or  any  provisions  are  adopted 
pursuant  to  Article  23. 
4.  The Advisory Committee shall consist of representa-
tives  of  the  authorities  of  the  Member  States.  Each 
Member State shall appoint one or two  representatives ; if 
unable to attend, they may be replaced by other represen-
tatives.  At  least  one  of  the  representatives  of  a  Member 
State shall be competent in matters of restrictive  practices 
and  dominant  positions. 5.  Consultation  shall  take  place  at  a  joint  meeting 
convened at the invitation of and ·chaired by the Commis-
sion. A summary of  the.  case, together with an indication 
of the most important documents and a preliminary draft 
of the decision to be taken for each case considered, shall 
be  sent with the invitation. The ~eeting shall  take ·place 
not less  than  14. days  after  the  invitation  has  been sent. 
The Commission  may in exceptional  cases  shorten  that 
period  as  appropriate  in  order  to  avoid  serious  harm  to 
one or more of the undertakings concerned by a concen-
tration. 
6.  The  Advisory  Committee  shall  deliver  an  opinion 
on the Commission's draft decision, if necessary by taking 
a vote. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion 
even if some members are absent and unrepresented. The 
opinion shall be  delivered in writing and appended to the 
draft  decision.  The  Commission  shall  take  the  utmost 
account  of  the  opinion  delivered  by  the  Committee.  It 
shall  inform the Committee of  the  manner in  which  its 
opinion  has  been  taken  into  account. 
7.  The Advisory  Committee may recommend publica-
tion of the opinion. The Commission may carry out such 
publication.  The  decision  to  publish  shall  take  due 
account of the  legitimate interest of  undertakings in the 
protection of their business secrets  and of the interest of 
the  undertakings  concerned in  such  publication's  taking 
place. 
Article  20 
Publication of decisions 
I.  The Commission shall  publish the decisions which 
it  takes  pursuant  to  Article  8  (2)  to  (5)  in  the  Official 
journal of the  European  Communities. 
2.  The publication shall state  the  names of the parties 
and the main content of  the decision ; it shall have  regard 
to  the  legitimate  interest of undertakings  in  the  protec-
tion  of  their business  secrets. 
Article  21 
Jurisdiction 
1.  Subject  to  review  by  the  Court  of  Justice,  the 
Commission shall have  sole  jurisdiction to  take the deci-
sions  provided  for  in  this  Regulation. 
2.  No Member State ·shall apply its national legislation 
on competition to  any consideration that has  a Commu-
nity  dimension. 
The first  subparagraph shall  be  without prejudice  to  any 
Member State's power to carry out any enquiries necessary 
for  the  application  of  Article  9  (2)  or  after  referral, 
pursuant to Article 9 (3),  first  subparagraph, indent (b),  or 
(5), to take the measures strictly necessary for  the applica-
tion  of  Article  9  (8). 
3.  Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States 
may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate inte-
rests  other  than  those  taken  into  consideration  by  this 
Regulation  and  compatible  With  the  general  principles 
and  other  provisions  of  Community  law. 
Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules 
shall  be  regarded  as  legitimate  interests  within·  the 
meaning  of  the  first  subparagraph. 
Any  other public  interest must be communicated to  the 
Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be. 
recognized by the Commission after an assessment of  its 
compatibility with the general principles and other provi-
sions of  Community law  before  the  measures  referred  to 
above  may  be  taken. The Commission  shall  inform  the 
Member State concerned of its decision within one month 
of  that  communication. 
Article  22 
Application of the Regulation 
I.  This Regulation alone shall apply to  concentrations 
as  defined  in  Article  3. 
2.  Regulations  No  17 ('),  (EEC)  No  I 017/68 (2),  (EEC) 
No 4056/86 (')  and (EEC)  No 3975/87 (')  shall  not apply 
to  concentrations  as  defined  in  Article  3. 
3.  If the Commission finds, at the request of a Member 
State, that a concentration as  defined in Article 3 that has 
no  Community dimension within the meaning of Article 
1 creates or strengthens a dominant position as  a result of 
which  effective  competition  would  be  significantly 
impeded  within  the  territory  of  the  Member  State 
concerned  it  may,  in  so  far  as  the  concentration  ~ffects 
trade  between  Member  States,  adopt  the  decisions 
provided for in Article 8 (2), second subparagraph, (3)  and 
(4). 
4.  Articles  2 (I) (a)  and (b),  5,  6,  8  and  10  to  20  shall 
apply.  The  period  within  which  proceedings  may  be 
initiated pursuant to  Article  I 0 (1) shall begin on the date 
of  the receipt of the request from  the Member State. The 
request  must be  made within  one month at  most of  the 
date on which the concentration was made known to  the 
Member State or effected. This period shall begin on the 
date  of  the  first  of  those  events. 
5.  Pursuant to  paragraph 3 the Commission shall  take 
only the  measures  strictly necessary to  maintain or store 
effective  competition within the territory of the Member 
State  at  the  request  of  which  it intervenes. 
6.  Paragraphs 3  to' 5 shall  continue to  apply  until the 
thresholds referred to in Article I (2) have been reviewed. 
(')  OJ No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(~OJ No  L 175,  23.  7.  1968,  p.  I. 
(')  OJ  No  L 378,  31.  12.  1986,  p.  4. 
(')  OJ  No  L 374,  31.  12.  !987,  p.  I. 
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Implementing provisions 
The  Commission  shall  have  the. power  to  adopt  imple-
menting  provisions  concerning  the  form,  content  and 
other details  of  notifications  pursuant  to  Article  4,  time 
limits  pursuant  to  Article  I 0,  and  hearings  purs\)ant  to 
Article  18. 
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Article" 24 
Relations with non-member countries 
I.  The Member States shall inform the Commission of 
any general difficulties encountered by their undertakings 
with  concentrations  as  defined  in  Article  3  in  a  non-
member  country. 
2.  Initially not more than one year after the entry into 
force  of  this  Regulation  and  thereafter  periodically  the 
Commission shall draw up a report examining the  treat-
ment accorded to  Community undertakings, in  the terms 
referred  to  in. paragraphs  3 and  4,  as  regards  concentra-
tions  in  non-member  countries. The  Commission  shall 
submit  those  reports  to  the  Council,  together  with  any 
recommendations. 
3.  Whenever it appears  to  the  Commission, either on . 
the basis  of  the  reports  referred  to  in  paragraph  2 or on 
the · basis  of  other  information,  that  a  non-member 
country  does  not  grant  Community  undertakings  treat-
ment comparable  to  that granted  by  the  Community to 
undertakings  from  that  non-member  country,  the 
Commission may submit proposals  to  the Council for  an 
appropriate  mandate  for  negotiation  with  a  view  to 
obtaining comparable treatment for Community underta-
kings. 
· 4.  Measures taken under this Article shall comply with 
the  obligations  of  the  Community  or  of  the  Member 
States,  without  prejudice  to  Article  234  of  the  Treaty, 
under  international  agreements,  whether  bilateral  or 
multilateral. 
Article  25 
Entry into force 
I.  This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  21 
September  1990. 
2.  This Regulation shall not apply to any concentration 
which  was  the subject of an  agreement or announcement 
or  where  control  was  acquired  within  the  ineaning  of 
Article 4 (!)before the date of this Regulation's entry into 
force  and it shall  not in  any circumstances apply  to any 
concentration  in  respect  of  which  proceedings  were 
initiated  before  that  date  by  a  Member Siate's  authority 
with  responsibility  for  competition. 
This  Regulation  shall  be  binding in  its  entirety and  directly  applicable  in  all  Member 
States. 
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Notes on Council Regulation (EEC) 
4064/89 
For all  appropriate purposes and  in  particular with  a 
view  to  clarifying  the  scope  of certain  articles  of the 
regulation, the following texts are drawn to the notice 
of interested parties: 
re Article I 
• The  Commission  considers  that  the  threshold  for 
world turnover as set in Article  I (2) (a) of this regula-
tion  for  the  initial  stage  of implementation  must  be 
lowered  to  ECU  2 000  million  at  the  end  of  that 
period.  The  de  minimis  threshold  as  set  out  in  (b) 
should  also be revised  in  the  light  of experience  and 
the  trend  of the  main  threshold.  It therefore  under-
takes to submit a proposal to that effect to the Coun-
cil in due course. 
• The Council and the  Commission  state their readi-
ness  to  consider taking  other factors  into  account  in 
addition to turnover when the thresholds are revised. 
• The Council and the Commission consider that the 
review  of  the  thresholds  as  provided  for  in  Article 
I (3) will have to be combined with a special re-exam-
ination  of the  method  of calculation of the  turnover 
of joint undertakings as referred to in Article 5 (5). 
re Article 2 
•  The Commission states that among the factors to be 
taken  into consideration  for  the  purpose of establish-
ing the  compatibility or  incompatibility of a concen-
tration  - factors  as  referred  to  in  Article  2 (I)  and 
explained in  Recital 13-account should be taken in 
particular  of  the  competitiveness  of  undertakings 
located in regions which are greatly in need of restruc-
turing owing inter alia to slow development. 
•  Under  the  first  subparagraph  of Article  2 (I),  the 
Commission  has  to  establish  in  respect  of each  con-
centration covered by the regulation whether that con-
centration  is  compatible  or  incompatible  with  the 
common market. 
The  appraisal  necessary  for  this  purpose  will  have to 
be made on the basis of the same factors as defined in 
Article  2 (l)(a) and  (b)  and  within  the  context  of a 
single appraisal procedure. 
If, at the end of the first stage of appraisal (within one 
month  of notification),  the  Commission  reaches  the 
conclusion  that  the  concentration  is  not  likely  to 
create  or  reinforce  a  dominant  position  within  the 
meaning of Article  2 (3),  it will  decide against initiat-
ing  proceedings.  Such  a decision  will  then  establish 
the  concentrations's  compatibility  with  the  common 
market. It will  be presented in  the form of a letter and 
will  be notified to the undertakings concerned and to 
the competent authorities of the Member States. 
If the Commission has decided to initiate proceedings 
because  it  concludes  that  there  is  prima  facie  a real 
risk  of creating  or  reinforcing  a dominant  position, 
and if furtherinvestigation (within a maximum period 
of four  months  of the  initiation  of proceedings) con-
firms  this  suspicion .  it  will  declare  the  concentration 
incompatible  with  the  common  market.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  the  initial  assumption  is  proved  to  be 
unfounded  in  the  light  of  the  further  investigation, 
possibly  in  view  of the  changes  made  by  the  under-
takings concerned to their initial project, the Commis-
sion will adopt a final  decision  noting that the opera-
tion  is  compatible  with  operation  of the  common 
market. 
The  decision  on  compatibility  is  therefore  only  the 
counterpart to a decision  on incompatibility or prohi-
bition. 
• The Commission considers that the  concept of 'the 
structure of all  the  markets concerned' refers  both  to 
markets  within  the  Community  and to  those  outside 
it. 
•  The Commission considers that the concept of tech-
nical  and ·economic  progress  must  be  understood  in 
the light of the principles enshrined in Article 85 (3) of 
the Treaty, as interpreted by the case law of the Court 
of Justice. 
23 re Article 3 (2),jirst indent 
The Commission considers that this rule  also  applies 
to consortia in the liner trades sector. 
re Article 5 (3) (a} 
The  Council  and  the  Commission  consider  that  the 
criterion defined  as  a proportion  of assets should  be 
replaced  by a concept of banking income as  referred 
to  in  Directive  86/635  on  the  annual  accounts  and 
consolidated  accounts  of banks  and  other  financial 
institutions,  either  at  the  actual  time  of entry  into 
force of the relevant provisions of that directive or at 
the  time  of  the  review  of thresholds  referred  to  in 
Article  I of this regulation and  in the light of experi-
ence acquired. 
re Article 9 
• The  Council  and  the  Commission  consider  that, 
when a specific market represents a substantial part of 
the  common  market, the  referral  procedure  provided 
for in  Article 9 should only be applied in exceptional 
cases. There are indeed grounds  for taking as  a basis 
the  principle  that  a  concentration  which  creates  or 
reinforces a dominant position in a substantial part of 
the  common  market  must  be  declared  incompatible 
with the common  market. The Council and the Com-
mission consider that such an application of Article 9 
should  be  confined  to cases  in  which the  interests  in 
respect  of  competition  of  the  Member  State  con-
cerned could not be adequately protected in any other 
way. 
They consider that  the review of Article 9 referred  to 
in  paragraph  10 thereof should  be  canied out in  the 
light  of  the  experience  gained  in  its  application 
(which  it  is  envisaged  will  be  exceptional),  having 
regard  to  the  importance of the  principle of exclusiv-
ity  and  the  need  to  provide  clarity and  certainty for 
firms,  with  a view  to  considering whether  it  remains 
appropriate to include it in the regulation. 
• The  Commission  states  that  the  preparatory  steps 
within  the meaning of Article 9 (4) (b) which  must be 
taken  during the  period  of three  months  are  prelimi-
nary  measures  which  should  lead  to  a final  decision 
within the remaining period of two-and-a-half months 
and  normally  take  the  form  of  the  notification  of 
objections within the meaning of Article  18 (I). 
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re Articles 9(5)and 10(5) 
The Commission states that  it  intends,  in  all  cases of 
concentrations  which  are  duly  notified,  to  take  the 
decisions  provided  for  in  Article  6 (1),  Article  8 (2) 
and (3) and Article 9 (3). Any Member State or under-
taking  concerned  may  ask  the  Commission  to  give 
written confirmation of its position with regard  to the 
concentration. 
re Articles 12 and 13 
The Commission states that, pursuant to the principle 
of  proportionality,  it  will  carry  out  investigations 
within the  meaning of Articles  12  and  13  only  where 
particular circumstances so require. 
re Article 19 
The  Council  and  the  Commission  agree  that  the 
arrangements  for  publication  referred  to  in  Article 
19 (7) will  be reviewed  after four years  in  the  light of 
the experience acquired. 
re Article 21 (3) 
I.  Application  of the  general  clause  on  'legitimate 
interests' must be subject to the following principles: 
•  It shall create no new rights for Member States and 
shall  be  restricted  to  sanctioning  the  recognition  in 
Community  Jaw  of their  present  reserved  powers  to 
intervene  in  certain  aspects  of concentrations affect-
ing  the  tenitory  coming  within  their  jurisdiction  on 
grounds  other than  those  covered  by  this  regulation. 
The  application  of  this  clause  therefore  reaffirms 
Member States' ability on those grounds either to pro-
hibit  a concentration  or  to  make  it  subject  to  addi-
tional conditions and requirements.  It does not imply 
the attribution to them of any power to authorize con-
centrations  which  the  Commission  may  have  prohi-
bited under this regulation. 
•  Nor,  by  invoking  the  protection  of the  legitimate 
interests referred to, may a Member State justify itself 
on the  basis of considerations which the Commission 
must take into account in assessing concentrations on a European scale.  While mindful of the  need to  con-
serve  and develop  effective  competition  in  the  com-
mon  market  as  required  by  the  Treaty,  the  Commis-
sion  must - in  line  with  consistent decisions of the 
Court  of Justice  concerning  the  application  of the 
rules of competition contained in  the Treaty - place 
its assessment of the  compatibility of a concentration 
in  the  overall  context of the  achievement of the  fun-
damental  objectives  of  the  Treaty  mentioned  in 
Article 2,  as  well  as  that  of strengthening  the  Com-
munity's economic and social cohesion referred to in 
Article  130a. 
•  In  order  that  the  Commission  may  recognize  the 
compatibility  of  the  public  interest  claimed  by  a 
Member  State  with  the  general  principles  and  other 
provisions of Community law, it is essential that pro-
hibitions or restrictions placed on the forming of con-
centrations  should  constitute  neither a form  of arbi-
trary  discrimination  nor  a  disguised  restriction  in 
trade between Member States. 
•  In  application  of the  principle of necessity or  effi-
cacity  and  of  the  rule  of  proportionality,  measures 
which  may  be  taken  by  Member  States  must  satisfy 
the  criterion  of appropriateness  for  the objective and 
must  be  limited  to  the  minimum  of action  necessary 
to ensure protection of the legitimate interest in ques-
tion.  The  Member  States  must  therefore  choose, 
where  alternatives  exist,  the  measure  which  is  objec-
tively the least restrictive to achieve the end pursued. 
2.  The  Commission  considers  that  the  three  specific 
categories  of legitimate  interests  which  any  Member 
State  may  freely  cite  under this  provision  are  to  be 
interpreted as follows: 
• The  reference  to  'public security'  is  made  without 
prejudice to the  provisions of Article 223  on  national 
defence,  which  allow  a Member State to intervene  in 
respect of a concentration which would be contrary to 
the essential  interests of its  security and  is  connected 
with  the  production  of or  trade  in  arms,  munitions 
and  war  material.  The  restriction  set  by  that  article 
concerning products not intended for specifically mil-
itary purposes should be complied with. 
There may be wider considerations of public security, 
both  in  the sense of Article 224 and in that of Article 
36, in addition  to defence interests in  the strict sense. 
Thus  the  requirement  for  public  security,  as  inter-
preted by the Court of Justice, could cover security of 
supplies  to  the  country  in  question  of a product  or 
service considered of vital  or essential interest for the 
protection of the population's health. 
•  The  Member States' right  to  plead the  'plurality of 
the media' recognizes the legitimate concern to main-
tain  diversified sources of information for the sake of 
plurality of opinion and multiplicity of views. 
•  Legitimate invocation may also be made of the pru-
dential  rules  in  Member States, which relate in  parti-
cular  to  financial  services;  the  application  of these 
rules  is  normally confined  to  national  bodies  for  the 
surveillance  of banks,  stockbroking  firms  and  insur-
ance companies. They concern, for example, the good 
repute of individuals, the honesty of transactions and 
the rules of solvency. These specific prudential criteria 
are  also  the  subject  of efforts  aimed  at  a minimum 
degree  of  harmonization  being  made  in  order  to 
ensure  uniform  'rules of play' in the Community as a 
whole. 
re Article 22 
• The  Commission  states  that  it  does  not  normally 
intend to apply Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty estab-
lishing  the  European  Economic  Community  to  con-
centrations  as  defined  in  Article  3  other  than  by 
means of this regulation. 
However, it reserves the right to take action in accord-
ance  with  the  procedures  laid  down  in  Article  89  of 
the Treaty, for concentrations as  defined in  Article  3, 
but  which  do  not  have  a  Community  dimension 
within the meaning of Article  I, in cases not provided 
for by Article 22.  · 
In any event, it does  not intend to take action  in  res-
pect of concentrations  with  a world-wide turnover of 
less  than  ECU  2 000  million  or  below  a  minimum 
Community  turnover  level  of  ECU  I  00  million  or 
which  are  not  covered  by the  threshold  of two-thirds 
provided for in the last part of the sentence in  Article 
I (2), on the grounds that below such levels a concen-
tration  would  not  normally  significantly  affect  trade 
between Member States. 
•  The  Council  and  the  Commission  note  that  the 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity contains  no  provisions  making specific refer-
ence to the prior control of concentrations. 
Acting  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  the 
Council  has  therefore  decided,  in  accordance  with 
25 Article 235 of the Treaty, to set up a new mechanism 
for the control of concentrations. 
The Council and the Commission consider, for press-
ing reasons of legal  security, that this  new  regulation 
will  apply solely and  exclusively to concentrations as 
defined in Article 3. 
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• The  Council  and  the  Commission  state  that  the 
provisions of Article 22 (3) to (5) in  no way  prejudice 
the power of Member States other than that at whose 
request  the  Commission  intervenes  to  apply  their 
national laws within their respective territories. COMMISSION  REGULATION (EEC)  No 2367/90 
of  25  July  1990 
on  the  notifications,  time  limits  and  hearings  provided  for  in  Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between 
undertakings 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community, 
Having regard  to  Council  Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 
of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of  concentrations 
between  undertakings ('),  and  in  particular  Article  23 
thereof, 
Having regard to  Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 
1962,  First  Regulation  implementing Articles  85  and 86 
of the Treaty (2),  as  last amended by the Act of Accession 
of Spain and Portugal, and in  particular Article 24 thereof, 
Having  regard  to  Council Regulation (EEC)  No  1017/68 
of 19 July 1968 applying rules of competition to  transport 
by  rail,  road  and  inland waterway('),  as  last  amended  by 
the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in parti-
cular  Article  29  thereof, 
Having regard  to  Council  Regulation (EEC)  No 4056/86 
of  22  December 1986  laying down  detailed  rules  for  the 
application  of  Articles  85  and  86  of  the Treaty to  mari-
time  transport ('),  and  in  particular  Article  26  thereof, 
Having regard  to  Council  Regulation (EEC)  No 3975/87 
of  14  December  19 87  laying down  detailed  rules  for  the 
application of the competition rules to undertakings in air 
transport ('1,  and  in  particular  Article  19  thereof, 
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Concentra-
tions,  as  well  as  the Advisory  Committees on Restrictive 
Practices  and  Monopolies  in  the  Transport  Industry,  in 
Maritime  Transport  and  in  Air  Transport, 
I. Whereas Article 23  of Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 
empowers  the  Commission  to  adopt  implementing 
provisions  concerning  the  form,  content  and  other 
details  of  notifications  pursuant  to  Article  4,  time 
limits  pursuant to  Article  I 0,  and  hearings  pursuant 
to  Article  18 ; 
2.  Whereas  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89  is  based  on 
the principle of compulsory notification of concentra-
tions  before  they are  put into  effect ; hereas,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  notification  has  important  legal  conse-
quences which are favourable  to  the parties, while, on 
the other hand, failure  to comply with the obligation 
(')  OJ  No  L 395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  1. 
( 2)  OJ  No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(')  OJ  No  L  175,  23.  7.  1968,  p.  1. 
(')  OJ  No  L 378,  31.  12.  1986,  p.  4. 
(1  OJ  No  L 374,  31.  12.  1987,  p.  1. 
to  notify renders the parties liable  to a fine  and may 
also  entail  civil  law  disadvantages  for  them ; whereas 
it  is  therefore  necessary  in  the  interests  of  legal 
certainty  to  define  precisely  the  subject  matter and 
content of the information to be provided in the noti-
fication;  · 
3.  Whereas it  is  for  the  parties concerned  to  make full 
and honest disclosure to  the Commission of the facts 
and  circumstances  which  are  relevant  for  taking  a 
decision  on  the  notified  concentration ; 
4.  Whereas  in  order to  simplify and expedite  examina-
tion of the notification it is  desirable to  prescribe that 
a  form  be  used ; 
5.  Whereas since  notification  sets  in  motion  legal  time 
limits for  initiating proceedings and for decisions, the 
conditions governing such  time  limits  and  the  time 
when  they  become  effective  must  also  be  deter-
mined; 
6.  Whereas  rules  must be  laid  down  in  the  interests  of 
legal certainty for calculating the time limits provided 
for  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 ;  whereas  in 
particular  the  beginning and end of the  period  and 
the  circumstances  suspending  the  running  of  the 
period  must be  determined ; whereas  the  provisions 
should  be  based  on  the  principles  of'  Regulation 
(EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71  of 3 June 1971  determi-
ning  the  rules  applicable  to  periods,  dates  and time 
limits ('),  subject  to  certain  adaptations  made  neces-
sary  by  the  exceptionally  short  legal  time  limits 
referred  to  above ; 
. 7.  Whereas the provisions  relating to  the Commission's 
procedure  must  be  framed  in  such  way  as  to  safe-
guard  fully  the  right  to  be  heard  and  the  rights  of 
defence; 
8.  Whereas  the  Commission  will  give  the  parties 
concerned, if  they so  request, an  opportunity  before 
notification  to  discuss  the  intended  concentration 
informally and in strict confidence; whereas in addi-
tion  it will,  after  notification,  maintain  close  contact 
with the parties  concerned to the extent necessary to 
discuss  with  them  any  practical  or  legal  problems 
which  it discovers  on a first  examination of the case 
and if  possible  to  remove  such problems by  mutual 
agreement; 
(')OJ  No  L  124,  8.  6.  1971,  p.  1. 
27 9.  Whereas in accordance with the principle of the right 
to be heard, the parties concerned must be given the 
opportunity  to  submit  their  comments  on  all  the 
objections  which  the  Commission  proposes  to  take 
into  account  in  its  decisions ; 
I 0.  Whereas third parties  having sufficient interest must 
also  be  given  the  opportunity  of  expressing  their 
views  where  they  make  a  written  application ; 
II. Whereas  the  various  persons  entitled  to  submit 
comments should do so in writing, both in their own 
interest  and  in .  the  interest  of  good  administration, 
without  prejudice  to  their  right  to  request  an  oral 
hearing where appropriate to supplement the written 
procedure ;  whereas  in  urgent  cases,  however,  the 
Commission must be able to proceed immediately to 
oral  hearings  of  the  parties  concerned  or  third 
parties ; hereas in such cases  the persons to  be heard 
must have· the right to  confirm  their oral statements 
in  writing; 
12.  Whereas it is necessary to define the rights of persons 
who are  to  be  heard, to  what extent they should  be 
granted access to  the Commission's file  and on what 
conditions  they  may  be  represented  or  assisted ; 
13.  Whereas  it  is  also  necessary  to  define  the  rules  for 
fixing and calculating the time limits for  reply  fixed 
by  the  Commission ; 
14.  Whereas the Advisory Committee on Concentrations 
shall deliver its opinion on the basis of a preliminary 
draft decision ; whereas it must therefore be consulted 
on  a  case  after  the  inquiry in  to  that case  has  been 
completed ;  whereas  such  consultatio~  does  not, 
however,  prevent  the  Commission  from  re-opening 
an  inquiry  if  need  be, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION : 
SECTION  I 
NOTIFICATIONS 
Article  1 
Persons entitled to submit notifications 
I.  Notifications  shall  be submitted  by  the  persons  or 
undertakings  referred  to  in  Article  4  (2)  of  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  4064/89. 
2.  Where notifications are  signed by representatives of 
persons  or  of  undertakings,  such  representatives  shall 
produce  written  proof  that  they are  authorized  to  act. 
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3.  Joint  notifications  should  be  submitted  by  a  joint 
representative  who  is  authorized  to  transmit  and  to 
receive  documents on  behalf  of  all  notifying  parties. 
Article  2 
Submission of notifications 
I.  Notifications shall be submitted in the manner pres-
cribed by form  CO as  shown in Annex I. Joint notifica-
tions  shall  be  submitted  on  a  single  form. 
2.  Twenty copies of each notification and fifteen copies 
of the supporting  documents  shall  be  submitted  to  the· 
Commission  at  the  address  indicated  in  form  CO. 
3.  The supporting documents shall be either originals 
or copies of the originals ; in the latter case  the notifying 
parties  shall  confirm  that  they  are  true  and  complete. 
4.  Notifications shall be in one of the official languages 
of  the  Community.  This  language  shall  also  be  the 
language  of  the  proceeding  for  the  notifying  parties. 
Supporting documents shall be submitted in their original 
language.  Where the original  language  is  not one of the 
official  languages,  a  translation  into  the  language  of  the 
proceeding shall  be  attached. 
Article 3 
Information to be  provided 
I.  Notifications  shall  contain  the  information 
requested by  form  CO. The information  must be  correct 
and  complete. 
2.  Material changes in the facts  specified in the notifi-
cation which the notifying parties know or ought to  have 
known must be communicated to the Commission volun-
tarily  and  without  delay. 
3.  Incorrect or misleading information shall be deemed 
to  be  incomplete  information. 
Article  4 
Effective  date of notifications 
I.  Subject  to  paragraph  2  notifications  shall  become 
effective  on  the date on which  they  are  received  by the 
Commission. 
2.  Subject  to  paragraph  3,  where  the  information 
contained in  the notification  is  incomplete in  a  material 
respect,  the  Commission  shall  without delay  inform  the 
notifying parties or the joint representative in writing and 
shall  fix  an  appropriate time limit for  the completion of 
the  informaion ;  in  such  cases,  the  notification  shall 
become  effective  on  the  date  on  which  the  complete 
information  is  received  by  the  Commission. 3.  Th~ Commission may  dispense  with  the obligation 
to  provide  any  particular information  requested by  form 
CO  where  the  Commission  considers  that  such  infor-
matin is not necessary for the examination of the case. 
4.  The  Commission  shall  without  delay  acknowledge 
in writing to  the notifying parties or the joint representa-
tive  receipt of the notification and of any reply to a letter 
sent by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2 above. 
Article  5 
Conversion of notifications 
I.  Where  the  Commission  finds  that  the  operation 
notified  does  not  constitute  a  concentration  within  the 
meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89  it 
shall inform the notifying parties  or the joint representa-
tive  in writing.  In  such  a  case,  the  Commission may,  ;f 
requested  by  the  notifying  parties,  as  appropriate  and 
subject to  paragraph  2  below, treat the notification  as  an 
application within the meaning of Article 2 or a notifica-
tion within the meaning of Article 4 of Regulation No 17, 
as  an  application  within the  meaning of  Article  12  or a 
notification within the . meaning of Article  14  of  Regula-
tion  (EEC)  No  1017/68,  as  an  application  within  the 
meaning of Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 or 
as  an application witin  the meaning of Article 3 (2)  or of 
Article  5 of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3975/87. 
2.  In cases  referred to in paragraph  I, second sentence, 
the Commission may  require that the  information given 
in the notification be supplemented within an appropriate 
time  limit  fixed  by it  in  so  far  as  this  is  necessary  for 
assessing  the  operation  on  the  basis  of  the  abovemen-
tioned  Regulations. The application  or  notification  shall 
be deemed to  fulfil  the requirements of  such Regulations 
from the date of the original notification where  the addi-
tional information is  received by the Commission within 
the  time  limit fixed. 
SECfiON  II 
TIME  LIMITS FOR  INITIATING PROCEEDINGS. AND 
FOR  DECISIONS 
Article  6 
Beginning of the time limit 
I.  The periods  referred  to  in Article ,I 0 (I)  of  Regula-
tion (EEC) No 4064/89 shall start at the beginning of the 
day following the effective date of  the notification, within 
the meaning of Article 4 (I) and (2) of this Regulation. 
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2.  The period referred to in Article I 0 (3) of Regulation 
(EEC)  No 4064/89 shall start at the beginning of  the day 
following  the  day  on  which  proceedings  were  initiated. 
3.  Where the first day of a period is  not a working day 
within the meaning of Article  19, the period shall start at 
the  beginning  of  the  following  working  day. 
Article  7 
End -of  the time  limit 
I.  The period  referred  to  in  the  first  subparagraph  of 
Article  10  (!) of  Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 shall end 
with the expiry of the day which in the month following 
that in  which the period began falls  on the same date as 
the  day  from  which  the period  runs.  Where such a  day 
does  not occur iii  that month, the  period shall end with 
the  expiry  of  the  last  day  of  that  month. 
2.  The period referred  to  in the  second sub-paragraph 
of Article  I 0  (I) of  Regulation· (EEC)  No  4064/89  shall 
end with  the expiry of  the day. which  in  the  sixth week 
following that in which the period began is  the same day 
of  the  week  asthe  day  from  which  the  period  runs. 
3.  The period referred to in Article I 0 (3) of Regulation 
(EEC)  No 4064/89 shall end with  the  expiry of  the day 
which  in  the  fourth  month following  that in  which  the 
period  began  falls  on  the  same  date  as  the  day  from 
which the period runs. Where such a day does not occur 
in that month, the period shall end with the expiry of the 
last  day  of  that  month.  · 
4.  Where the last  day  of the  period  is  not  a working 
day  within  the  meaning  of  Article  19,  the  period  shall 
end with  the  expiry  of  the  following  working  day. 
5.  Paragraphs 2 to 4 above shall be subject to  the provi-
sions  of Article  8. 
Article  8 
Addition of holidays 
Where public holidays or other holidays of the Commis-
sion  as  defined  in  Article  19  fall  within  the  periods 
referred to  in Article  I 0 (I) and in Article I 0 (3)  of  Regu-
lation (EEC)  No 4064/89, these periods shall be extended 
by  a  corresponding  number of  days. 
Article  9 
Suspension of the time limit 
I.  The period referred to in Article I 0 (3) of Regulation 
(EEC)  No  4064/89  shall  be  suspended  where  the 
Commission, pursuant to  Articles  II (5)  or  13  (3)  of the 
same  Regulation,  has  to  take  a  decision  because : 
(a)  Information  which  the  Commission  has  requested 
pursuant  to  Article  II  (2)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89 from an undertaking involved in a concentra-
tion is not provided or not provided in full  within the 
time  limit fixed  by the  Commission ; 
(b)  an  undertaking  involved  in  the  concentration  has 
refused  to  submit to  an  investigation  deemed  neces-
sary by the Commission on the basis of Article 13 (I) 
of  Regulation  (EEC) .No  4064/89  or  to  cooperate  in 
the  carrying  out  of  such  an  investigation  in  accor-
dance  with  the  abovementioned  provision ; 
(c)  the  notifying  parties  have  failed  to  inform  ·the 
Commission of material changes in the facts specified 
in  the  notification. 
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(EEC)  No  4064/89  shall  be  suspended : 
(a)  in the cases referred to  in subparagraph 1 (a) above, for 
the  period  between  the end of the time limit fixed  in 
the  request  for  information  and  the  receipt  of  the 
complete  and  correct  information  required  by  deci-
sion; 
(b)  in  the cases  referred  to  in subparagraph  I  (b)  above, 
for  the  period  between  the  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
carry out the investigation and the completion of  the 
investigation  ordered  by  decision ; 
(c)  in  the cases referred to in subparagraph  I (c) above, for 
the  period  between  the  occurrence  of  the change  in 
the  facts  referred  to  therein  and  the  receipt  of  the 
complete  arid  correct  information  requested  by  deci-
sion or the completion of .the investigation ordered by 
decision. 
3. '  The suspension of the time limit shall begin  on the 
day  following  that  on  which  the  event  causing  the 
suspension  occurred.  It  shall  end  with  the  expiry of  the 
day  on  which  the  reason  for  suspension  is  removed. 
Where such day is  not a working day within the meaning 
of  Article  19,  the suspension of the  time  limit shall  end 
with  the  expiry  of  the  following  working  day. 
Article  10 
Compliance with  the time limit 
The  time  limits  referred  to  in  Article  10  (1)  and  (3)  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  shall  be  met  where  the 
Commission  has  taken  the  relevant  decision  before  the 
end  of  the  period.  Notification  of  the  decision  to  the 
undertakings  concerned  must  follow  without  delay. 
SECfiON  III 
HEARING OF THE PARTIES AND OF THIRD PARTIES 
Article  11 
Decisions  on  the  suspension of concentrations 
l.  Where  the  Commission  intends to  take  a  decision 
under Article 7 (2)  of Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 or a 
decision  under  Article  7  (4)  of  that  Regulation  which 
adversely affects the parties, it shall, pursuant to Article 18 
(I)  of  that  Regulation,  inform  the  parties  concerned  in 
writing of  its  objections and shall  fix  a time limit within 
which  they  may  make  known  their views. 
2.  Where the Commission pursuant to Article  18  (2)  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  N•  4064/89  has  taken  a  decision 
referred  to  in  paragraph  I  provisionally  without  having 
given  the  parties  concerned  the  opportunity  to  make 
known their views, it shall without delay and in  any event 
before the expiry of the suspension send them the text of 
the provisional decision  and shall  fi)t  a time  limit within 
which  they  may  make  known  their  views. 
Once  the  parties  concerned  have  made  known  their 
views,  the Commission shall take  a final  decision annul-
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ling,  amending  or  confirming  the  provisional  decision. 
Where the  parties concerned have  not made known their 
view within the time limit fixed,  the Commission's provi-
sional decision shall  become final  with the expiry of that 
period. 
3.  The parties concerned shall make known their views 
in writing or orally within the time limit fixed. They may 
confirm  their  oral  statements  in  wrting. 
Article  12 
Decisions on the substance  of the case 
I.  Where the  Commission  intends  to  take  a  decision 
pursuant to  Article  8 (2),  second  subparagraph, Article  8 
(3) (4) and (5), Article 14 or Article 15 of Regulation (EEC) 
No  4064/89,  it  shall,  before  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee  on  Concentrations,  hold  a  hearing  of  the 
parties  concerned  pursuant  to  Article  18  of  that Regula-
tion. 
2.  The Commission shall inform the parties concerned 
in  writing of its  objections. The communication shall  be 
addressed to the notifying parties or to the joint represen-
tative.  The  Commission  shall,  when  giving  notice  of 
objections,  fix  a  time  limit  within  which  the  parties 
concerned  may  inform  the  Commission  of  their  views. 
3.  Having  informed  the  parties  of  its  objections,  the 
Commission  shall  upon  request  give  the  parties 
concerned access  to the file  for  the purposes of preparing 
their observations.  Documents shall  not  be  accessible  in 
so  far  as  they  contain  business  secrets  of  other  parties 
concerned or of  third parties, or other confidential infor-
mation  including  sensitive  commercial  information  the 
disClosure of which would have a significant adverse effect 
on  the  supplier  of  such  information  or where  they  are · 
internal  documents  of  the  authorities. 
4.  The  parties  concerned  shall,  within  the  time  limit 
fixed,  make known in writing their views on the Commis-
sion's objections. The may in their written comments set 
out all  matters  relevant  to  the  case  and  may  attach  any 
relevant  documents  in  proof  of  the  facts  set  out.  They 
may also propose that the Commission hear persons who 
may  corroborate  those  facts. 
Article  13 
Oral hearings 
I.  The Commission shall  afford  parties concerned who 
have so requested in their written comments the opportu-
nity  to  put  forward  their  arguments  orally,  if  those 
persons  show  a sufficient  interest  or if the  Commission 
proposes to impose a fine  or periodic penalty payment on 
them.  It  may  also  in  other  cases  afford  the  parties 
concerned  the  opportunity  of  expressing  their  views 
orally. 
2.  The Commission  shall  summon  the  persons  to  be 
heard  to  attend  on such  date  as  it  shall  appoint. 
3.  It shall forthwith transmit a copy of the summons to 
the competent authorities of the Member States, who may 
appoint an  official  to  take  part  in  the  hearing. Article  14 
Hearings 
I.  Hearings  shall  be  conducted  by  persons  appointed 
by  the  Commission  for  that  purpose. 
2.  Persons  summoned to  attend shall  either appear in 
person or be represented by legal representatives or repre-
sentatives  authorized  by  their constitution.  Undertakings 
and associations of  undertakings may be  represented by  a 
. duly  authorized  agent  appointed  from  among  their 
permanent staff. 
3.  Persons  heard  by  the  Commission  may  be  assisted 
by lawyers or university teachers who are entitled to plead 
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
in  accordance  with  Article  17  of  ihe  Protocol  on  the 
Statute (EEC) of the Court of Justice, or by other qualified 
persons. 
4.  Hearings shall not be  public. Persons shall be heard 
separately or in  the  presence of.other persons summoned 
to  attend.  In  the  latter  case,  regard  shall  be  had  to  the 
legitimate  interest of the  undertakings  in  the  protection 
of  their  business  secrets. 
5.  The statemepts made by each person heard shall be 
recorded. 
Article  15 
Hearing of third parties 
I.  If natural or legal  persons showing a sufficient inte-
rest,  and  especially  members  of  the  administrative  or 
management  organs  of  the  undertakings  concerned  or 
recognized workers'  representatives of those undertakings, 
apply  in  writing  to  be  heard  pursuant· to  the  second 
sentence  of  Article  18  (4)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89, the Commission shall inform them in writing of 
the  nature and subject matter oi the pro.cedure  and shall 
fix  a time limit within which they may make known their 
views. 
2.  The  third  parties_ referred  to  in  paragraph  1 above 
shall  make  known their views  in writing or orally within 
the  time  limit fixed.  They may  confirm  their oral  state-
ments  in writing. 
3.  The Commission  may  likewise  afford  to  any  other 
third  parties  the  opportunity  of  expressing  their  views. 
SECTION  IV 
MISCELLANEOUS  PROVISIONS 
Article  16 
Transmission of documents 
1.  Transmission  of  documents  and  summonses  from 
the Commission to the addressees may be  effected in any 
of  the  following  ways : 
(a)  delivery  by  hand  against  receipt; 
(b)  registered  letter  with  acknowledgement  of  receipt; 
(c)  telefax with a request for acknowledgement oi receipt ; 
(d)  telex. 
2.  Subject  to  Article  18  (1 ),  paragraph  1  above  also 
applies to the transmission of documents from the parties 
concerned  or from  third  parties  to  the  Commission. 
3.  Where a document is  sent by  telex  or by  telefax,  it 
shall  be  presumed  that  it  has  been  received  by  the 
addressee  on  the  day  on  which  it  was  sent. 
Article  17 
Setting of time limits 
1.  In  fixing  the  time  limits  provided  for  in  Articles  4 
(2),  5 (2),  II (I) and (2),  12 (2) and 15 (1),  the Commission 
shall  have  regard  to  the time  required  for  preparation  of 
statements  and  to  the  urgency  of  the  case.  It shall  also 
take  account of public holidays  in  the country of  receipt 
of  the  Commission's  communication. 
2.  The day  on which the addressee received a commu-
nication shall  not be  taken  into account for  the purpose 
of  fixing  time  limits 
Article  18 
Receipt of documents by  the  Commission 
!.  Subject  to  Article  4  (1 ),  notifications  must be  deli-
vered to  the Commission at the address indicated in form 
CO or have  been  dispatched  by  registered  letter  before 
expiry of the period referred to in Article 4 (I) of Regula-
tion (EEC) No 4064/89. Additional information requested 
to  complete  notifications  pursuant  to  Article  4  (2)  or to 
supplement notifications  pursuant to  Article  5 (2)  of  this 
Regulation must reach the Commission at the aforesaid or 
have been dispatched by registered letter before the expiry 
of  the  time  limit  fixed  in  each  case.  Written  comments 
on  Commission  communications pursuant to  Articles  II 
(I)  and  (2),  12  (2)  and  15  (I)  must  be  delivered  to  the 
Commission at the aforesaid address before the time limit 
fixed  in  each  case. 
2.  Where  the  last  day  of a  period  referred  to  in  para-
graph  I  is  a day  by which  documents  must be  received 
and that day  is  not a working day  within the  meaning of 
Article  19,  the  period  shall  end with  the  expiry  of  the 
following  working  day. 
3.  Where  the  last day of  ·a  period  referred  to  in  para-
graph  I  is  a day  by which documents must be dispatched 
and  that  day  is  a Saturday,  Sunday  or  public  holiday  in 
the  country  of  dispatch,  the  period  shall  end  with  the 
expiry  of  the  following  working  day  in  that  country. 
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Definition of Commission working days 
The term  'working days'  in Articles  6 (3), 7 (4),  9 (3)  and 
18  (2)  means  all  days  other  than  Saturdays,  Sundays, 
public holidays set out in Annex II and other holidays as 
determined  by  the  Commission  and  published  in  the 
Official journal of the  European  Communities  before 
the  beginning of each  year. 
Article  20 
. Entry into  force 
This Regulation  shall  enter into  force  on  21  September 
1990. 
This  Regulation  shall  be  binding  in  its  entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  all  Member 
States. 
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FORM CO RELATING TO THE NOTIFICATION OF A CONCENTRATION PURSUANT TO 
.  COUNCIL REGULATION  (EEC)  No 4064/89 
A.  Introduction 
This form  specifies the information to  be provided  by an  undertaking or undertakings when  notifying the 
Commission of a concentration with a Community dimension. A 'concentration' is defined in Article 3 and 
'Community dimension'  by  Article  I  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89. 
Your attention  is  particularly drawn  to  Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 and to  Co;,mission Regulation (EEC) 
No  2367/90.  In  particular  you  should  note  that: 
(a)  all  information  requested  by  this  form  must be  provided.  However  if,  in good faith,  you  are  unable  to 
provide a response to  a question or can only respond to  a limited extent on the basis of available .infor-
mation, indicate this and .give  reasons. If you  consider that any particular information requested by  this 
form  may not be necessary for  the Commission's examination of the case, you  may ask the Commission 
to  dispense  with  the  obligation  to  provide  that  information,  under  Article  4 (3)  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  2367/90 ;  · 
(b)  unless  all  sections  are  completed  in  full  or good  reasons  are  given  explaining why  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  complete unanswered questions (for example,  because of the unavailability of information on 
a target company during a contested bid) the notification will be  incomplete and will only become effec-
tive on the date on which all the information  is  received. The notification will  be  deemed to  be incom-
plete  if  information  is  incorrect  or misleading ; 
(c)  incorrect or misleading information where supplied intentionally or negligently could make you liable to 
a  fine. 
B.  Who  must notify 
In the case of a merger (within the meaning of Article 3 (I) (a) of Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 or the acqui-
sition  of  joint  control  in  a  undertaking within  the  meaning of  Article  3 (1)  (b)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89, the notification shalt be completed jointly by the parties to  the merger or by those acquiring joint 
control  as  the  case  may  be. 
In  the  case  of  the  acquisition  of  a  controlling  interest  in  an  undertaking by  another,  the  acquirer  must 
complete  the  notification. 
In  the  case  of  a  public  bid  to  acquire  an  undertaking,  the  bidder  must  complete  the  notification. 
Each party completing the notification is responsible for the accuracy of the information which it provides. 
For the  purposes of this  form  'the parties  to  the  concentration' fthe  parties')  includes  the  undertaking in 
which  a  controlling  interest  is  being  acquired  or which  is  the  subject  of  a  public  bid. 
C.  Supporting documentation 
The  completed  notification  must  be  accompanied  by  the  following : 
(a)  copies of the final or most recent versions of all documents bringing about the concentration, whether by 
agreement  between  the  parties  concerned,  acquisition  of  a  controlling  interest  or  a  public  bid ; 
(b)  in  a public bid, a copy of  the  offer  document. If unavailable on notification it  should  be  submitted as 
soon  as  possible  and  not  later  than  when  it  is  posted  to  shareholders; 
(c)  copies  of  the  most  recent  annual  reports  and  accounts  of  all  the  parties  to  the  concentration ; 
(d)  copies of  reports or analyses which  have  been  prepared for  the  purposes of the concentration and  from 
which information has been taken in order to provide the information requested in sections 5 and 6 ; 
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(e)  a list and short description of the contents of all  other analyses, reports, studies and surveys prepared by 
or for any of  the notifying parties  for  the purpose of  assessing or analysing the  proposed concentration 
with  respect  to  competitive conditions, competitors (actual  and potential), and  market conditions. Each 
item  in  the  list  must  include  the  name  and  position  held  of  the  author. 
D.  How  to  notify 
The notification  must  be  completed  in  one of  the  official  languages  of  the  European  Community. This 
language  shall  thereafter  be  the  language  of  the  proceeding  for  all  notifying  parties. 
The information  requested  by  this  form  is  to  be set  out using the sections and paragraph  numbers of the 
form. 
Supporting documents shall be submitted in their original language ; where this is  not an  official language of 
the  Community they  shall  be  translated,  into  the  language of the proceeding (Article  2  (4)  of  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  2367/90). 
The supporting documents may be originals or copies of the originals.  In  the latter case  the notifying party 
shall  confirm  that  they  are  true  and  complete. 
The financial data requested  in Section 2.4  below must be  provided in  Ecus at  the average conversion  rates 
prevailing  for  the  years  or other period  in  question. 
Twenty  copies  of  each  notification  and  fifteen  copies  of  all  supporting  documents  must  be  provided. 
The  notification  should  be  sent  to : 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
Directorate  General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Merger Task  Force  (Cort.  150), 
200,  rue  de  Ia  Loi, 
B-1 049  Brussels ; 
or be  delivered  by  hand  during  normal  Commission  working  hours  at  the  following  address : 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
Directorate  General  for  Competition (DG  IV), 
Merger  Task  Force, 
150,  avenue  de  Gartenberg, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
E.  Secrecy 
Article  214  of  the Treaty and  Article  17  (2)  of Regulation (EEC)  No  4064/89  require  the  Commission and 
the Member States, their officials and other servants not to  disclose  information they have acquired through 
the  application of the  Regulation  of  the  kind  covered  by  the obligation of  professional  secrecy. The same 
principle  must  also  apply  to  protect  confidentiality  as  between  notifying  parties. 
If you  believe  that your interests would be  harmed if any of the information you are asked  to supply was  to 
be published or otherwise divulged to other parties, submit this information separately with each page clearly 
marked  'Business  secrets'. You  should  also  give  reasons  why  this  information  should  not  be  divulged  or 
published. 
In  the case  of  mergers or joint acquisitions, or  in  other cases where  the  notification  is  completed by  more 
than one of the parties, busine');  secr~ts may be submitted under separate cover, and referred to in  the notifi-
cation as  an annex. In such cases the notification will  be considered complete on receipt of all  the annexes. 
F.  References 
All  references contained in this form  are  to the relevant articles and  paragraphs of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No  4064/89. SECfiON 
l.l.  Information  on  notifying party (or parties) 
Give  details  of : 
l.l.l.  name  and  address  of  undertaking, 
1.1.2.  nature  of  the  undertaking's  business, 
1.1.3.  name,  address,  telephone,  fax  and/or  telex  of, and position  held  by,  the  person  to  be  contacted. 
1.2.  Information  on  other parties  to  the  concentration(')(') 
For  each  party  to  the  concentration  (except  the  notifying  party)  give  details  of : 
1.2.1.  name  and  address  of  undertaking, 
1.2.2.  nature  of  the  undertaking's  business, 
1.2.3.  name, address, telephone, fax  and/or telex of, and in position held by, the person to be contacted.  · 
1.3.  Address for  service 
Give  an  address  in  Brussels  if  available  to  which  all  communications may be  made  and documents 
delivered  in  accordance  with  Article  1  (4)  of  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2367/90. 
1.4.  Appointment  of representatives 
Article  1 (2)  of  Commission Regulation (EEC)  2367/90 states  that where  notifications are  signed  by 
representatives of  undertakings, such representatives shall  produce written proof that they are  autho-
rized to act. Such written authorization must accompany the  notification and the following details of 
the representatives  of  the notifying party or parties  and  other parties to  the  concentration are  to  be 
given  below : 
1.4.1.  is  this  a  joint  notification ? 
1.4.2.  if  'yes',  has  a  joint  representative  been  appointed ? 
if  'yes',  please  give  the  details  requested  in  1.4.3  to  1.4.6  below; 
if 'no', please give details of the representatives who have  been  authorized to act  for  each  of  the 
parties  to  the  concentration  indicating  who  they  represent; 
1.4.3.  name  of  representative ; 
1.4.4.  address  of  representative ; 
1.4.5.  name  of  person  to  be  contacted  (and  address  if  different  from  1.4.4) ; 
1.4.6.  telephone,  telefax  and/or  telex. 
SECfiON 2 
Details of the concentration 
2.1.  Briefly  describe  the  nature  of  the  concentration  being  notified.  In  doing  so  state : 
- whether  the proposed  concentration  is  a full  legal  merger, an  acquisition, a concentrative  joint 
venture or a contract or other means conferring direct or indirect control within the meaning of 
Article  3  (3); 
- whether  the  whole  or  parts  of  parties  are  subject  to  the  concentration ; 
- whether any public offer for the securities of one party by another has  the support of the former's 
supervisory  boards  of  management  or other  bodies  legally  representing  the  party  concerned. 
2.2.  List  the  economic  sectors  involved  in  the  concentration. 
2.3.  Give  a brief  explanation  of  the  economic  and  financial  details  of  the  concentration.  In  doing so 
provide,  where  relevan~ information  about  the  following :  · 
- any financial or other support received from  whatever source (including public authorities) by any 
of  the  parties  and  the  nature  and  amount  of  this  support, 
-·  the proposed or expected date of any major events designed to  bring about the completion of the 
concentration, 
- the  proposed  structure  of  ownership  and  control  after  the  completion  of  the  concentration. 
(')  A concentration  is  defined  in  Article  3. 
(~ This includes the target company in the case of a contested bid, in which case the details should be completed as far  as is 
possible. 
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2.4.  For each  of the parties, the notifying party shall provide  the  following data for the last three financial 
years: 
2.4.1.  worldwide  turnover('), 
2.4.2.  Community-wide  turnover(') (2), 
2.4.3.  turnover  in  each  Member  State(') (2), 
2.4.4.  the  Member  State,  if  any,  in  which  more  than  two-thirds  of  Community-wide  turnover  is  achi-
eved(')('), 
2.4.5.  profits  before  tax  worldwide (3), 
2.4.6.  number  of  employees  worldwide(~. 
SECI'ION  3 
Ownership and control (') 
For each of the parties provide a list of all undertakings belonging to the same group. This list must include : 
3.1.  all  undertakings controlled by the parties, directly or indirectly, within the meaning of Anicle 3 (3); 
3.2.  all  undertakings or persons controlling the parties directly or indirectly within the meaning of Article 
3 (3); 
3.3.  for each undertaking or person identified in  3.2 above,  a complete list of all  undertakings controlled 
by  them  directly  or  indirectly,  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3 (3). 
For  each  entry  to  the  list  the  nature  and  means  of  control  shall  be  specified ; 
3.4.  provide  details  of  acquisitions  made  during  the  last  three  years  by  the  groups  identified  above,  of 
undertakings  active  in  affected  markets  as  defined  in  section  5 below. 
The  information sought in  this section  may be  illustrated by the use  of charts or diagrams where this helps 
to  give  a better understanding of  the  pre-concentration structure of  ownership and  control  of  the  underta-
kings. 
SECI'ION  4 
Personal  and  financial  links 
With  respect  to  each  undertaking  or  person  disclosed  in  response  to  Section  3 provide : 
4.1.  ·a  list  of all  other undertakings which are  active  on  affected  markets (affected  markers  are  defined  in 
section  5)  in  which  the undertakings of the group  hold  individually or collectively 10% or  more  of 
the  voting  rights  or  issued  share  capital.  In  each  case  state  the  percentage  held; 
4.2.  a list of all other undertakings which are active on affected markets in  which  the P.ersons disclosed in 
response  to  Section  3 holJ  I  0% or  more  of  the voting  rights  or issued  share  capital.  In  each  case 
stare  the  percentage  held ; 
4.3.  a list  for  each  undertaking of the members of their boards of management who are  also  members of 
the boards of  management or of  the supervisory boards  of any other undertaking, which  is  active  on 
affected  markets ; and (where  applicable) for  each  undertaking a list of the  members of  their supervi-
sory  boards  who  are  also  members of  the  boards of  management of  any  other undertaking which  is 
active  on  affected  markers ;  · 
in  each  case  staring  the  name  of  the  other  undertaking  and  the  position  held. 
Information  provided  here  may  be  illustrated  by  the  use  of  charts  or diagrams  where  this  helps  to  give  a 
better  understanding. 
(1)  See  Article  5 for  the  definition of turnover and  note  the  special  provisions  for  credit,  insurance,  other  financial  institu-
tions  and  joint  undertakings. 
For insurance undertakings, credit and other financia]  institutions, Community-residents and  residents of a Member State 
are defined as  natural or legal  persons having their residence  in  a Member State, thereby following the  respective nalional 
legislation.  The  corporate  customer  is  to  be  treated  as  resident  in  the  country  in  which  it  is  legally  incorporated. 
For the calculation of turnover, the  notifying party should also refer to the ex.amples : guidance  n_ote  1 for credit and  other 
financial  institutions ; guldance  note  II  for  insurance  undertakings~ guidance  note  III  for  joint  undertakings. 
(1)  See guidance note  fV  for the calculation of turnover in  one Member State with  respect to Community-wide turnover. 
(
1
)  "Profits  before  tax'  shall  comprise  profit  on  ordinary  activities  before  tax  on  profit. 
(
4
)  Employees shall comprise  all  persons employed  in  the enterprise  who  have a contract of employment and  receive  remu-
neration.  · 
(~ See  Article  3  (3)  to (5). SECTION  5 
Information on  affected markets 
The  notifying  party  shall  provide  the  data  requested  having  regard  to  the  following  definitions : · 
PRODUCT MARKETS 
A relevant product market comprises all  those  products and/or services which  are  regarded  as  interchange-
able  or  substitutable  by  the  consumer,  by  reason  of  the  products'  characteristics,  their  prices  and  their 
intended .use. 
A relevant product market may in some cases  be  composed of  a number of individual  product groups. An 
individual product group is  a product or small group of products which present largely identical physical or 
technical characteristics and are fully interchangeable. The difference between products within the group will 
be sinall and usually only a matter of brand and/or image. The product market will  usually be the classifica-
tion  used  by  the  undertaking  in  its  marketing  operations. 
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC  MARKET 
The  rele~ant geographic market comprises the area in which the imdertakinga concerned are involved in the 
supply of  products  or services,  in which  the  conditions of  competition  are  sufficiently hom<?geneous  and 
which can  be  distinguished  from  neighbouring areas  because,  in  particular,  conditions  of competition are 
appreciably  different  in  those  areas. 
Factors relevant to the assessment of the relevant geographic market include the nature and characteristics of 
the products or services concerned, the existence of entry barriers or consumer preferences, appreciable diffe-
rences  of  the  undertakings'  market  shares  between  neighbouring  areas  or  substantial  price  differences. 
AFFECTED  MARKETS 
. Affected  markets consist of  relevant product markets or individual .product groups, in  the Common Market 
or a  Member  State  or,  where  different,  in  any  relevant  geographic  market  where : 
(a)  two  or more of  the parties (including undertakings belonging to  the same group as  defined in Section 3) 
are  engaged in business activities in the same product market or individual product group and where the 
concentration will  lead to a combined market share of  I 0 % or more. These are horizontal relationships; 
or 
(b)  any  of  the  parties  (including  undertakings  belonging  to  the  same  group  as  defined  in  Section  3)  is 
engaged in business activities in a product market which is upstream or downstream of a product market 
or individual product group in which any  other party is  engaged and any of their market shares is  I 0 % 
or more, regardless of whether there is  or is  not any existing supplier/customer relationship between the 
parties  concerned. These  are  vertical  relationships. 
I.  Explanation  of the  affected  relevant product  markets 
5.1.  Describe  each  affected  relevant  product  market and explain why  the  products and/or services  in 
these  markets  are  included (and why  others are  excluded)  by  reason  of their characteristics, their 
prices  and  their  intended  use. 
5.2.  List the individual ·product groups defined  internally by  your undertaking for  marketing purposes 
which  are  covered  by  each  relevant  product  market  described  under  5.1  above. 
II. Market  data  on  affected  markets 
For each affected relevant product market and, where  differen~ individual product group, for each of the 
last  three  financial  years : 
(a)  for  the  Community  as  a  whole ; 
(b)  individually for  each Member State where the parties (including undertakings belonging to  the same 
group  as  defined  in  Section  3)  do  business; 
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(c)  and  where  different,  for  any  relevant geographic  market, 
provide  the  following : 
5.3.  an  estimate of the value of the  market and, where appropriate, of the volume (for  example in 
units shipped or delivered) of the market('). If available,  include statistics  prepared  by other 
sources to  illustrate your answers. Also  provide a forecast  of  the  evolution of demand on  the 
affected  markets ; 
5.4.  the turnover of each of the groups to which the parties belong (as defined in Section 3); 
5.5.  an  estimate  of  the  market  share  of  each  of  the  groups  to  which  the  parties  belong ; 
5.6.  an  estimate  of the  market share  (in  value  and where  appropriate  volume)  of all  competitors 
having at least  I 0 % of the geographic market under consideration. Provide the name, address 
and  telephone  number of these  undertakings ; 
5.7.  a  comparison  of  prices  charged  by  the  groups  to  which  the  parties  belong  in  each  of  the 
Member States and a similar  compariso~ of such price levels between the Community and its 
major  trading  partners (eg  the  United  States,  Japan  and  EITA); 
5.8.  an estimate of the value (and where appropriate volume) and source of  imports to  the relevant 
geographic  market ; 
5.9.  the proportion of such imports that are derived from  the groups to  which the parties belong; 
5.10.  an  ~stimate of the extent to  which any  of these imports are  affected by any tariff or non-tariff 
barriers  to  trade. 
III. Market  data  on  conglomerate  aspects 
In the absence of  horizontal or vertical  relationships, where  any of the parties (including undertakings 
belonging to  the same group  as  defiried  in Section 3)  holds  a market share  of  25 % or more for  any 
product  market  or  individual  product group,  provide  the  following  information : 
5.11.  a description  of each  relevant product  market and  explain  why  the  products  and/or services  in 
these  markets are  included (and  why  others are  excluded) by  reason of their characteristics, their 
prices  and  their  intended  use ; 
S  .12.  a  list  of  the  individual  product  groups  defined  internally  by  your  undertaking  for  marketing 
purposes  which  are  covered  by  each  relevant  product  market  described ; 
5.13.  an estimate of the value of the  market and the  market shares of each of the groups to  which  the 
parties belong for each  affected  relevant  product market and, where different,  individual  product 
group,  for  the  last  financial  year : 
(a)  for  the  Community  as  a  whole ; 
(b)  individually for each Member State where the groups to  which the parties belong do busihess ; 
(c)  and  where  different,  for  any  relevant  geographic  market. 
In each response in Section 5 the notifying party shall explain the basis of the estimates used or assumptions 
made. 
SECTION  6 
General conditions in affected markets 
The following information shall be provided in  relation to  the affected relevant product markets and, where 
different,  affected  individual  product  groups: 
RECORD  OF  MARKET  ENTRY 
6.1.  Over the  last  five  years  (or a longer period  if  this  is  more  appropriate) has  there  been  any significant 
entry to these markets in the Community? If the answer is 'yes', provide information on these entrants, 
estimating  their  current  market  shares. 
(')  The value and volume of a market should reflect output less exports plus imports  for  the geographic market under consi· 
deration. 6.2.  In the opinion of the notifiying party are  there undertakings (including those at present operating only 
in extra-Community markets) that could enter the  Community's markets ? If the answer is 'yes', provide 
information  on  these  potential  entrants. 
6.3.  In the opinion ol the notifying party what is the likelihood of s'ignificant market entry over the next five 
years ?  · 
FACTORS  INFLUENCING  MARKET  ENTRY 
6.4.  Describe the various factors influencing entry into affected markets that· exist in the present case, exam-
ining entry from  both a geographical and product viewpoint.  In so  doing take account of the following 
where  appropriate : 
- the total costs of entry (capital, promotion, advertising, necessary distribution systems, servicing etc.) 
on a  scale  equivalent  to  a  significant  viable  competitor,  indicating  the  market  share  of  such  a 
competitor; · 
- to what extent is entry to the markets influenced by  the requirement of government authorization or 
standard setting in any form ? Are there any legal or regulatory controls on entry to  these markets ? 
- to  what  extent  is  entry  to  the  markets  influenced  by  the  availability  of  raw  materials? 
- to what extent is  entry to  the markets influenced by  the length of  contracts between an  undertaking 
and  its  suppliers  and/or customers? 
- describe  the  importance  of  licensing  patents,  know-how  and  other  rights  in  these  markets. 
VERTICAL  INTEGRATION 
6.5.  Describe  the  nature  and  extent  of  vertical  integration  of  each  of  the  parties. 
RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
6.6.  Give an account of the importance of research and development in the ability of a firm operating on the 
relevant market to compete in  the long  term.  Explain the nature  of  the research  and development in 
affected  markets  carried  out  by  the  undertakings  to  the  concentration. 
In  so  doing  take  account  of  the  following  where  appropriate : 
- the research and development intensities(') for these markets and the relevant research and develop-
ment intensities  for  the  parties  concerned ; 
- the course of  technological development for  these markets over an  appropriate time period (inclu-
ding  developments  in  products  and/or  services,  production  processes,  distribution  systems  etc); 
- the major innovations that have  been made in these  markets over this time period and the under-
takings  responsible  for  these  innovations ; 
- the cycle of innovation in these markets and where. the parties are in this cycle  of innovation; 
- describe the extent to which  the  parties concerned are  licensees or licensors of  patents, know-how 
and  other rights  in  affected  markets. 
DISTRIBUTION  AND  SERVICE  SYSTEMS 
6.7.  Explain· the distribution  channels and service  networks  that exist  on the affected  markets. In  so  doing 
take  account  of  the  following  where  appropriate : 
- the distribution systems  prevailing on the market and their importance. To what extent is distribu-
tion  performed by  third parties and/or undertakings belonging to  the same group as  the  parties  as 
disclosed  in  Section  3 ? 
- the service networks (for example maintenance and repair) prevailing and their importance in these 
markets. To what extent are such services perfo'rmed  by third parties and/or undertakings belonging 
to  the  same  group  as  the  parties  as  disclosed  in  Section  3 ?  1  · 
( 1)  Re~earch and development intensity is defined as  research  a.nd  developmen"t expenditure as a proportion of turnover. 
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COMPETITIVE  ENVIRONMENT 
6.8.  Give  details  (names, addresses and contacts) of  the  five  largest suppliers  to  the  notifying  parties  and 
their individual  share  of  the  purchases  of  the  notifying  parties. 
6.9.  Give  details (names, addresses and contacts) of the five  largest customers of the notifying parties and 
their  individual  share  of the  sales  of  the  notifying  parties. 
6.1 0.  Explain  the structure of supply and demand  in  affected  markets.  This explanation  should allow  the 
Commission  further to  appredate the  competitive environment in which  the  parties carry out their 
business.  In  so  doing  take  account  of  the  following  where  appropriate : 
- the phases of the markets in terms of, for example, take-off, expansion, maturity and decline. In the 
opinion of  the  notifying  party,  where  are  the  affected  products  in  these  phases ? 
- the structure of supply. Give details of  the various identifiable categories that comprise the supply 
side  and  describe  the  'typical  supplier'  of  each  category; 
- ·the structure of demand. Give  details of the various identifiable groups that comprise the demand 
side  and  describe  the  'typical· customer'  of  each  group ; 
- whether public authorities, government agencies or state enterprises or similar bodies are important 
participants as  sources of supply or demand. In  any instance where  this is  so give  details of this 
participation ; 
- the total Community-wide capacity for the last three years. Over the period what proportion of this 
capacity is accounted for by the parties and what have been their rates of capacity utilization ? 
COOPERATIVE  AGREEMENTS 
6.11.  To what extent do cooperative agreements (horizontal and/or vertical) exist in the affected markets ? 
6.12.  Give  details, of the  most important cooperative  agreements engaged in  by  the  parties in the affected 
markets,  such  as  licensing agreements,  research  and  development,  specialization,  distribution,  long-
term  SUf1ply  and  exchange  of  information  agreements. 
TRADE  ASSOCIATIONS 
6.13.  List  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  principal  trade  associations  in  the  affected  markets. 
WORLDWIDE  CONTEXT 
6.14.  Describe the worldwide context of the proposed concentration indicating the position ·of the parties in 
this  market. 
SECTION  7 
General  matters 
7.1.  Describe  how  the proposed concentration  is  likely to  affect  the interests of intermediate and ultimate 
consumers,  and  the  development of technical  progress. 
7  .2.  In the event that the Commission finds that the operation notified does not constitute a concentration 
within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, do you request that it be treated as  an 
application within the meaning of Article 2 or a notification within the meaning of Article 4 of Regula-
tion No 17, as an application within the meaning of Article 12  or a notification within the meaning of 
Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68, as an application within the meaning of Article 12 of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 4056/86 or as  an application within the meaning of Article 3 (2) or Article 5 of Regula-
tion  (EEC)  No  3975/87 ? 
SECTION  8 
Declaration 
The notification must conclude with  the following dedaration which  is  to be signed by or on behalf of all 
the  notifying  parties. 
The undersigned declare that the information given in this notification is correct' to  the best of their know-
ledge and belief, that all estimates are  identified as  such and are  their best estimates of  the underlying facts 
and  that  all  the  opinions expressed  are  sincere. 
They are  aware  of  the  provisions  <if  Article  14  (I)  b  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89. 
Place  and  date : 
Signatures : · GUIDANCE  NOTE  I (') 
CALCULATION OF TURNOVER FOR CREDIT AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Article  5 (3)  (a)) 
For  the  calculation  of turnover  for  credit institutions and other financial  institutions,  we  give  the  following 
example  (proposed  merger  between  bank  A and  bank  B) 
I.  Consolidated balance sheets 
(in  million  ecu) 
Assets  Bank  A  Bank  B 
Loan~·  ~nd advances  to  credit  institutions  20 000  I 000 
- to  credit  institutions  within  the  Community :  (10 000)  (500) 
- to  credit institutions within  one  (and  the  same)  Member 
State  X:  (5 000)  (500) 
Loans  and  advances  to  customers  60 000  4 000 
- to  Community  residents :  (30 000)  (2000) 
- to  residents  of  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  X :  (15000)  (500) 
Other  assets :  20 000  I 000 
Total  assets :  100 000  6 000 
II.  Calculation  of  turnover 
In  place  of  turnover,  the  following  figures  shall  be  used : 
Bank A  Bank  B 
I: Aggregate  worldwide  turnover 
is  replaced  by  one-tenth  of  total  assets :  10 000  600 
the  total  sum  of  which  is  more  than  ECU  5 000  million. 
2.  Community-wide  turnover 
is replaced by, for each bank, one-tenth of total assets multiplied by the  ratio between loans  and advances 
to  credit institutio.ns  and  customers within  the  Community ; to  the  total  sum  of  loans  and  advances  to 
credit  institutions  and  customers. 
This  is  calculated  as  follows : 
one-tenth  of  total  assets : 
tvh'i~h  is  multiplied  for  each  bank  by  the  ratio  between : 
loans  and  advances  to  credit  institutions 
and  customers 
within  the  Community 
and 
the total sum of loans and advances to credit institutions 
and  customers 
For 
Bank  A: I  0 000  multiplied  by  (40 000 : 80 000)  =  5 000 
Bank  B :  600  multiplied  by  ( 2 500 :  5 000)  =  300 
which  exceeds  ECU  250  million  for  each  of  the  banks. 
Bank A 
10 000 
10 000 
30 000 
40 000 
20 000 
60 000 
80 000 
Bank B 
600 
500 
2000 
2 500 
I 000 
4000 
5000 
(1  In  the  following guidance  notes, the  terms 'institution' or 'undertaking' are used  subject to  the exact delimitation in each 
case. 
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3.  Total  turnover Within  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  X 
is. replaced  by  one-tenth of total  assets: 
Bank A 
. 10 000 
Bank B 
600 
which  is  multiplied  for  each  bank  by the  ratio  between  loans  and advances  to  credit institutions and 
customers within one and the same  Member State  X ; to  the total  sum of loans and advances  to  credit 
institutions  and  customers. 
This is  calculated  as  follows : 
loans  and  advances  to  credit  institutions 
and  customers 
within  one (and  the  same)  Member  State  X 
and 
the total sum of loans and advances to credit institutions 
and  customers 
For 
Bank  A :  I 0 000  multiplied  by (20 000 : 80 000)  =  2 500 
Bank  B :  600  multiplied  by  (  I 000 :  5 000)  =  120 
Result: 
Bank A 
5 000 
15000 
20 000 
80 000 
Bank B 
500 
500 
I 000 
5 000 
50% of bank .1\s  and 40 % of bank B's  Community-wide turnover are  achieved  in  one (and  the same) 
Member  State  X. 
III.  Conclusion : 
Since 
(a)  the  aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of  bank  A  plus  bank  B  is  more  than  ECU  5 000  million ; 
(b)  the  Community-wide  turnover  of  each  of  the  banks  is  more  than  ECU  250  million ;  and 
(c)  each of the banks achieve less  than  two-thirds of its  Community-wide turnover in  one (and  the same) 
Member  State, 
the  proposed  merger  would  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation. 
GUIDANCE  NOTE  II 
CALCULATION OF TURNOVER FOR  INSURANCE  UNDERTAKINGS 
(Article  5  (3)  (a)) 
For the calculation of turnover for insurance undertakings, we give the following example (proposed concen-
tration  between  insurances  A  and  B) : 
I.  Consolidated profit and loss account 
(in  million  ecu) 
lncome  Insurance  A  Insurance  B 
Gross  premiums  written  5000  300 
- gross  premiums  received  from  Community  residents :  (4 500)  (300) 
- gross  premiums received  from  residents  of one (and  the 
same)  Member State  X :  (3 600)  (270) 
Other income :  500  50 
Total  income :  5 500  350 
II.  Calculation of turnover 
I. Aggregate  worldwide  turnover 
is  replaced by the value of gross premiums written worldwide, the sum of which is ECU 5 300 million. 
2.  Community-wide  turnover 
is  replaced,  for  each  insurance undertakings, by  the  value  of gross  premiums written with  Community 
residents.  For  each  of  the  insurance  undertakings,  this  amount  is  more  than  ECU  250  million. 3.  TumofJer  within  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  X 
is replaced, for insurance undertakings, by the value of gross premiums written with residents of one (and 
the  same)  Member State  X.  · 
For  insurance  A,  it  achieves  80 %  of  its  gross  premiums  written  with  Community  residents  within 
Member State X, whereas for  insurance  B,  it achieves 90 % of its gross  premiums written with Commu-
nity  residents  in  that  Member  State  X. 
Ill. Conclusion· 
Since 
(a)  the  aggregate  worldwide  turnover of  insurances A and  B,  as  replaced  by  the value  of  gross  premiums 
written  worldwide,  is  more  than  ECU  5 000  million ; 
(b)  for each of the insurance undertakings, the value of gross premiums written with Community residents is 
more  than  ECU  250  million ; but 
(c)  each  of  the insurance  undertakings achieves  more  than  two-thirds  of  its  gross  premiums  written with 
Community  residents  in  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  X, 
the  proposed  concentration  would  not  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation. 
GUIDANCE  NOTE  Ill 
CALCULATION OF TURNOVER FOR JOINT UNDERTAKINGS 
A.  CREATION OF A JOINT UNDERTAKING (Article  3  (2)) 
In  a case  where  two  (or  more)  undertakings  create  a joint  undertaking  that  constitutes  a concentration, 
turnover  is  calculated  for  the  undertakings  concerned. 
B.  EXISTENCE  OF A JOINT UNDERTAKING (Article  5 (5)) 
For the calculation of turnover in case of the existence of a joint undertaking C between two undertakings A 
and  B concenred  in a  concentration,  we  give  the  following  example : 
I.  Profit and loss  accounts 
Sales  revenues  worldwide 
-Community 
- Member  State  Y 
Sales  revenues  worldwide 
- with  undertaking  A 
- with  undertaking  B 
Turnover 
Turnover 
Turnover  with  third  undertakings 
- Community-wide 
- in  Member  State  Y 
II.  Consideration of the  joint undertaking 
Undertaking  A 
10 000 
(8 000) 
(4000) 
(in  million  tcu) 
Undertaking  B 
2000 
(1  500) 
(900) 
(in  million  ecu) 
Joint  undertaking  C 
100 
70 
(20) 
(10) 
(60) 
(50) 
(a)  The undertaking C is  jointly controlled (in  the meaning of Article  3 (3) and (4))  by  the  undertakings A 
and B concerned by the concentration, irrespective of any third undertaking participating in that under-
taking  C. 
(b)  The  undertaking  C  is  not  consolidated  by  A and  B in  their  profit  and  loss  accounts. 
(c)  The  turnover  of  C  resulting  from  operations  with  A and  B shall  not  be  taken  into  account. 
(d)  The turnover of  C resulting from  operations with  any  third  undertaking shall  be  apportioned equally 
amongst  the  undertakings  A  and  B,  irrespective  of  their  individual  shareholdings  in  C. 
(e)  Any  joint undertaking existing between one  of  the  undertakings concerned and  any  third undertaking 
shall  (unless  already  consolidated)  not  be  taken  into  account. 
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III.  Calculation of turnover 
(a)  Undertaking A's aggregate  worldwide  turnover shall  be  calculated as  foliows:  ECU  10 000 million and 
50 %  of  C's  worldwide  turnover with  third undertakings  (i.e.  ECU  35  million~ the  sum of which  is 
ECU  I 0 035  million.  . 
Undertaking  B's  aggregate  worldwide  turnover shall  be  calculated  as  follows:  ECU  2 000  million and 
50% of  C's  worldwide  turnover with  third  undertakings (i.e.  ECU  35  million),  the  sum of  which  is 
ECU  2 035  million. 
(b)  The aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of  the  undertakings  concerned  is  ECU  12 070  million. 
(c)  Undertaking  A  achieves  ECU  4 025  million  within  Member  State  Y  (50 %  of  C's  turnover  in  this 
Member State  taken  into  account~ and a Community-wide  turnover  of  ECU  8 030  million (including 
50 %  of  C's  Community-wide  turnover); 
and  undertaking  B achieves  ECU  925  million  within  Member State Y (50 %  of  C's  turnover  in  this 
Member State  taken  into account), 'and  a Community-wide  turnover of ECU  I 530  million (including 
50 %  of  C's  Community-wide  turnover. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Since 
(a)  the  aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of  undertakings  A  and  B  is  more  than  ECU  5 000  million, 
(b)  each of the  undertakings concerned by the  concentration achieves  more  than  ECU  250  million within 
the  Community, 
(c)  each of the undertakings concerned (undertaking A 50,1  % and undertaking B 60,5 %) achieves less than 
two-thirds  of  its  Community-wide  turnover  in  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  Y, 
the  proposed  concentration  would  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation. 
GUIDANCE  NOTE  IV 
APPLICATION OF  THE TWO-THIRDS  RULE 
(Article  1) 
For  the  application  of  the  two-thirds  rule  for  undertakings,  we  give  the  following  examples  (proposed 
concentration  between  undertakings  A  and  B) : 
I.  Consolidated  profit and loss  accounts 
EXAMPLE  I 
Turnover 
Sales  revenues  worldwide 
- within  the  Community : 
- in  Member  State  X : 
EXAMPLE Z (a) 
Sales  revenues  worldwide 
- within  the  Community: 
- in  Member  State  X : 
EXAMPLE 2 (b) 
Turnover 
Undertaking A 
10 000 
(8 000) 
(6000) 
Undertaking  A 
4 800 
(2400) 
(2  100) 
(in  million  ecu) 
Undertaking  B 
500 
(400) 
(200) 
(in  million  tcu) 
Undertaking  B 
500 
(400) 
(300) 
same  figures  as  in  example  2  (a),  BUT  undertaking  B achieves  ECU  300  million  in  Member State  Y. II. Application  of  the  two-thirds  rule 
EXAMPLE 1 
I. Community-wide  turnover 
is,  for  undertaking A,  ECU  8 000  million  and  for  undertaking  B  ECU  400  million. 
2.  Turnover  in  one  (and  the  same) Member  State· X 
is, for undertaking A (ECU 6 000 million), 75% of its Community-wide turnover and is, for  undertaking 
B  (ECU  200  million),  50 %  of  its  Community-wide  turnover. 
3.  Conclusion 
In this case, although undertaking A achieves  more than two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover in 
Member State X, the proposed concentration would fall  under the scope of the Regulation due to the fact 
that undertaking B achieves less than two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover in Member State X 
EXAMPLE  2 (a) 
I.  Community-wide  turnover 
of  undertaking A  is  ECU  2 400  million  and of  undertaking  B,  ECU  400  million. 
2.  Turnover  in  one  (and  the  same)  Member  State  X 
is, for  undertaking A,  ECU 2 I 00  million (i. e.  87,5 % of its Community-wide turnover); and, for  under-
taking  B,  ECU  300  million  (i. e.  7  5 %  of  its  Community-wide  turnover). 
3.  Conclusion 
In this case, each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds  of its  Community-wide 
turnover in one (and  the  same) Member State  X ; the  proposed concentration would not fall  under the 
scope  of  the  Regulation. 
EXAMPLE 2 (b) 
Conclusion 
In  this  case,  the two-thirds rule would not apply due  to  the fact  that undertakings A and B achieve more 
than  two-thirds  of  their  Community-wide  turnover  in  different  Member  States  X and  Y.  Therefore,  the 
proposed  concentration would  fall  under the scope  of  the  Regulation. 
45  - tfft, Commission notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations under Council Regu-
lation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of 21  December  1989  on the  control  of concentrations  between 
undertakings ( ') 
I.  Introduction 
I.  Article  3 (1)  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89 ('the Regulation') contains an exhaustive list of 
the factual  circumstances which fall  to be  considered  as 
concentrations. In accordance with the 23rd recital, this 
term  refers  only  to  operations  that  lead  to  a  lasting 
change  in  the  structures  of  the  participating  under-
takings. 
By  contrast,  the  Regulation  does  not  deal  with  oper-
ations whose  object or effect is  the  coordination of the 
competitive  activities  of undertakings  that remain  inde-
pendent  of  each  other.  Situations  of  this  kind  are 
cooperative  in  character.  Accordingly,  they  fall  to  be 
assessed  under the provisions  of Regulations  (EEC)  No 
17 ('),  (EEC)  No  1017/68 ('),  No  4056/86 (')  or  No 
3975/87 (').  The  same  applies  to  an  operation  which 
includes both a lasting structural change and the coordi-
nation  of  competitive  behaviour,  where  the  two  are 
inseparable. 
If the structural change can  be  separated from  the coor-
dination  of  competitive  behaviour,  the  former  will  be 
assessed  under  the  Regulation  and  the  latter,  to  the 
extent that it does not amount to an ancillary restriction 
within the meaning of Article 8 (2), second subparagraph 
of the  Regulation,  falls  to  be  assessed  under the  other 
Regulations implementing Articles  85  and .86  of the EEC 
Treaty. 
2.  The purpose of this notice is  to define as  clearly as 
possible,  in  the interests of legal  certainty, concentrative 
and cooperative situations. This is  particularly important 
in the case of joint ventures. The same issue  is  raised  in 
other forms  of association between undertakings such as 
unilateral  or  reciprocal  shareholdings  and  common 
directorships,  and  of certain  operations  involving  more 
than  one  undertaking,  such  as  unilateral  or  reciprocal 
transfers  of  undertakings  or  parts  of  undertakings,  or 
joint  acquisition  of an  undertaking  with  a  view  to  its 
division. In  all  these cases, operations may not fall within 
the scope of the Regulation, where their object or effect 
is  the coordination of the  competitive  behaviour of the 
undertakings concerned. 
(')  OJ No  L 395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  1. 
(')  OJ No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(')  OJ No  L 175,  23.  7.  1968,  p.  1. 
(')  OJ No  L 378,  31.  12.  1986,  p.  4. 
(')  OJ No  L 374,  31.  12.  1987,  p.  1. 
3.  This  notice sets  out the main  considerations which 
will  determine the Commission's view to what extent the 
aforesaid operations are or are not caught by the Regu-
lation.  It is  not concerned with  the  assessment  of these 
operations, whether  under the Regulation  or any  other 
applicable provisions, in  particular Articles  85  and  86  of 
the  EEC Treaty. 
4.  The principles set out in this notice will be followed 
and  further  developed  by  the  Commission's  practice  in 
individual  cases.  As  the  operations  considered  are 
generally of a complex nature, this notice cannot provide 
a definitive  answer to all  conceivable situations. 
5.  This  notice  is  :without  prejudice  to  the  interpre-
tation which may be given by the Court of Justice or the 
Court of First  Instance  of the European  Communities. 
II.  Joint Ventures within Article 3 of the Regulation 
6.  The Regulation in  Article  3 (2)  refers  to two types 
of joint  venture:  those  which  have  as  their  object  or 
effect  the  coordination of the  competitive  behaviour of 
undertakings which  remain  independent  (referred  to  as 
'cooperative joint ventures') and those which perform on 
a  lasting  basis  all  the  functions  of  an  autonomous 
economic entity  and  which  do not give  rise  to coordi-
nation  amongst  themselves  or  between  them  and  the 
joint  venture  (referred  to  as  'concentrative  joint 
ventures'). The latter are concentrations and as  such are 
caught by the Regulation. Cooperative joint ventures fall 
to  be  considered. under other regulations  implementing 
Articles  85  and 86 ('). 
A.  Concept of joint venture 
7.  To  define  the  term  'joint  venture'  within  the 
meaning  of Article  3 (2),  it  is  necessary to refer to the 
provision  of  Article  3 (I) (b)  of  the  Regulation. 
According  to  the  latter, ]Vs are  undertakings  that  are 
jointly  controlled  by  several  other  undertakings,  the 
parent companies.  In  the  context of the  Regulation  the 
term JV thus implies  several characteristics: 
(')  See  footnotes  2 to 5 on  this  page. 
47 1.  Undertaking 
8.  A  JV  must  be  an  undertaking.  That  is  to  be 
understood  as  an  organized  assembly  of  human  and 
material  resources,  intended  to  pursue  a  defined 
economic purpose on a  long-term basis. 
2.  Control by  other undertakings 
9.  In the context of the Regulation, a JV is  controlled 
by other undertakings.  Pursuant  to  Article  3 (3)  of the 
Regulation,  control  means  the  possibility  of exercising, 
directly or indirectly,  a  decisive  influence  on  the  acti-
vities  of the JV; whether this  condition  is  fulfilled  can 
only be  decided by reference to all the legal  and  factual 
circumstances of the individual  case. 
10.  Control of a JV can be based on legal, contractual 
or other means, within which the following elements are 
especially important: 
- ownership or rights to the use  of all  or some of the 
JV's assets, 
- influence over the composition, voting or decisions of 
the managing or supervisory bodies of the JV, 
- voting  rights  in  the managing or supervisory bodies 
of the JV, 
- contracts  concerning  the  running  of  the  JV's 
business. 
3.  joint control 
11.  A JV under the  Regulation  is  jointly controlled. 
Joint  control  exists  where  the  parent companies  must 
agree  on decisions  concerning  the JV's activities,  either 
because  of the rights  acquired  in  the JV or because  of 
contracts  or other means  establishing  the joint control. 
Joint  control  may  be  provided  for  in  the  JV's 
constitution  (memorandum  or  articles  of  association). 
However, it need not be present from the beginning, but 
may  also  be  established  later,  in  particular by  taking  a 
share in  an existing undertaking. 
12.  There is  no joint control where one of the parent 
companies can decide alone on the JV's commercial acti-
vities.  This  is  generally  the  case  where  one  company 
owns  more than half the capital or assets  of the under-
taking,  has  the  right  to  appoint more  than  half of the 
managing or supervisory bodies, controls more than half 
of the votes  in  one of those bodies, or has the sole right 
to  manage  the  undertaking's business. Where the  other 
parent companies either have completely passive minority 
holdings or, while able to have  a certain influence on the 
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undertaking, cannot, individually or together, determine 
its  behaviour, a relative  majority of the  capital or of the 
votes or seats on the decision-making bodies will  suffice 
to control the  undertaking. 
13.  In many cases, the joint control of the JV is  based 
on  agreements  or  concertation  between  the  parent 
companies.  Thus, a  majority shareholder in  a JV often 
extends  to  one  or  more  minority  shareholders  a 
contractual' right to take part in  the control of the JV. If 
two undertakings each hold half of a JV, even if there is 
no agreement between them, both parent companies will 
be obliged permanently to cooperate so  as  to avoid reci-
procal  blocking  votes  on  decisions  affecting  the  JV'  s 
activity.  The same  applies  to JV's  with  three  or more 
parents, where  each  of them  has  a  right  of veto.  A JV 
can  even  be  controlled  by  a  considerable  number  of 
undertakings that can  together muster a majority of the 
capital or the seats or votes on the JV's decision-making 
bodies.  However,  in  such  cases,  joint  control  can  be 
presumed only if the  factual  and  legal  circumstances -
especially  a  convergence  of  economic  interestS  -
support the  notion of a deliberate common policy of the 
parent companies  in  relation to  the JV. 
14.  If one undertaking's holding  in  another is,  by  ics 
nature or its  extent, insufficient to establish sole  control, 
and  if  there  is  no  joint  control  together  with  third 
parties,  then  there  is  no  concentration  within  the 
meaning of Article  3 (1)  (b)  of the Regulation. Articles 
85  or 86  of the EEC Treaty may however be applicable 
on  the  basis  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  17  or  other 
implementing Regulations (see  III.!). 
B.  Concentrative joint ventures 
15.  For a joint venture to be regarded as concentrative 
it  must . fulfil  all  the  conditions  of  Article  3  (2), 
subparagraph  2,  which  lays  down  a  positive  condition 
and  a negative condition. 
I.  Positive condition: joint venture perfonning on a lasting 
basis  all  the /unctions  of  an  autonomous  economic  entity 
16.  To fulfil  this  condition,  a JV must  first  of all  act 
as an independent supplier and buyer on the market. JV  s 
that  take  over  from  their  parents  only  specific  partial 
responsibilities are not to be considered as concentrations 
where they are merely auxiliaries to the commercial acti-
vities  of the parent companies. This is the case where the 
JV  supplies  its  products  or  services  exclusively  to  its 
parent companies, or when it meets its own needs wholly 
from  them.  The independent market presence  can even be  insufficient  if  the  •JV  achieves  the  maJonty  of  its 
supplies  or sales  with third parties,  but remains  substan-
tially dependent on  its  parents for  the  maintenance  and 
development of its business. 
17.  A JV exists  on a lasting basis  if it is  intended and 
able. to  carry on its  activity for  an  unlimited, or at least 
for a long, time. If this  is  not the. case  there is  generally 
no  long-term  change  in  the  structures  of  the  parent 
companies. More important than the agreed duration are 
the  human and material resources of the JV. They must 
be  of such  nature  and  quantity  as  to  ensure  the  JV's 
existence  and  independence  in  the  long  term:  This  is 
generally  the  case  where  the  parent  companies  invest 
substantial  financial  resources  in  the  JV,  transfer  an 
existing  undertaking  or  business  to  it,  or  give  it 
substantial  technical  or commercial  know·-how,  so  that 
after an  initial starting-up period it can support itself by 
its  own  means. 
18.  A decisive  question  for  assessing  the  autonomous 
character  of the  JV  is  whether  it  is  in  a  position  to 
exercise its  own commercial policy. This requires; within 
the  limits  of its  company  objects,  that  it  plans,  decides 
and  acts  independently.  In  particular,  it  must be  free  to 
determine  its  competitive  behaviour  autonomously  and 
according  to  its  own  economic  interests.  If  the  JV 
depends  for  its  business  on  facilities  that remain  econ-
omically  integrated  with  the  parent  companies'  busi-
nesses,  that weakens the case for the autonomous nature 
of the JV. 
19.  The  JV's  economic  independence  will  not  be 
contested  merely  because  the  parent  companies  reserve 
to themselves  the right to take certain  decisions that are 
important for  the  development of the JV,  namely those 
concerning  alterations  of the  objects  of the  company, 
increases  or reductions  of capital,  or the  application  of 
profits.  However,  if  the  commercial  policy· of the  JV 
remains  in  the  hands of the parent undertakings, the JV 
may  take on the  aspect of an  instrument of the  parent 
undertakings'  market  interests.  Such  a  situation  will 
usually exist where the JV operates in  the market of the 
parent  undertakings.  It may  also  exist  where  the  JV 
operates in  markets neighbouring, or upstream or down-
stream of, those  of the  parent undertakings. 
2.  Negative  condition:  absence  of  coordination  of 
competitive  behaviour 
20.  Subject  to  what is  said  in  the first  paragraph  of 
this  notice  a JV can  only  be  considered  to  be  concen-
trative within the meaning of Article 3 (2), subparagraph 
2 of the  Regulation,  if it  does  not have  as  its  object or 
effect the  coordination of the  competitive  behaviour  of 
undertakings  that  remain  independent  of  each  other. 
There must not be  such coordination either between  the 
parent  companies  themselves  or between  any  or all  of 
them  on  the  one  hand  and the JV on the  other hand. 
Such  coordination  must  not be  an  object of the  estab-
lishment or operation of the JV, nor may it be the conse-
quence thereof. The JV is  not to  be regarded as concen-
trative if as  a result of the agreement to set up the JV or 
as  a  result  of its  existence  or activities  it  is  reasonably 
foreseeable that the competitive behaviour of a parent or 
of  the  JV  on  the  relevant  market  will  be  influenced. 
Conversely, there' will  normally be  no  foreseeable  coor-
dination  when  all  the  parent  companies  withdraw 
entirely  and  permanently from  the  JV's  market  and  do 
not operate on  markets  neighbouring those of the JV's. 
21.  Not every  cooperation between parent companies 
with  regard  to  the  JV  prevents  a  JV  from  being 
considered  concentrative.  Even  concentrative  JVs 
generally  represent  a  means  for  parent  companies  to 
pursue  common  or  mutually  complementary  interests. 
The establishment and joint control of a JV is,  therefore, 
inconceivable  without  an  understanding  between  the 
parent  companies  as  concerns  the  pursuit  of  those 
interests.  Irrespective  of  its  legal  form,  such  a 
concordance of interests  is  an  essential  feature  of a JV. 
22.  As  regards  the  relations  of  the  parent  under-
takings,  or any  one  of them,  with  the JV,  the  risk  of 
coordination within the meaning of Article 3 (2)  will  not 
normally  arise  where  the  parent  undertakings  are  not 
active  in  the  markets  of the  JV  or in  neighbouring  or 
upstream or downstream markets. In other cases, the risk 
of coordination will be  relatively small where the parents 
limit  the  influence  they  exercise  to  the  JV's  strategic 
decisions,  such  as  those  concerning the  future  direction 
of  investment,  and  ~hen they  express  their  financial, 
rather  than  their  market-oriented,  interests.  The 
membership of the JV's managing and .supervisory bodies 
is  also  important. Common membership of the JV's and 
the parent companies' decision-making bodies may be  an 
obstacle  to  the  development  of  the  JV's  autonomous 
commercial policy. 
23.  The  dividing  line  between  the  concordance  of 
interests  in  a  JV  and  a  coordination  of  competitive 
behaviour  that  is  incompatible  with  the  notion  of 
concentration  cannot  be  laid  down  for  all  conceivable 
kinds of case. The decisive factor is  not the legal form  of 
the  relationship  between  the  parent  companies  and 
between them and the ]V. The direct or indirect, actual 
or potential effects of the establishment and. operation of 
the  JV  on  market  relationships,  have  determinant 
importance. 
49 24.  In  assessing  the  likelihood  of  coordination  of 
competitive  behaviour,  it  is  useful  to  consider some  of 
the  different situations which  often occur: 
(a)  JVs that take over pre-existing activities of the parent 
companies; 
(b)  JV  s  that  undenake  new  activities  on  behalf  of the 
parent companies; 
(c)  JVs that enter the parent companies' markets; 
(d) JV  s  that  enter  upstream,  downstream  or  neigh-
bouring markets. 
(a)  JV  s that take over pre-existing activities of 
the parent companies 
25.  There is  normally  no  risk of coordination where 
the  parent  companies  transfer  the  whole  of  cenain 
business  activities  to  the JV  and  withdraw permanently 
from  the JV's market so  that they remain  neither actual 
nor potential competitors - of each other nor of the JV. 
In this  context, the notion of potential competition is  to 
be  interpreted  realistically,  according  to  the 
Commission's established practice ('). A presumption of a 
competitive  relationship  requires  not  only  that  one  or 
more  of the  parent companies  could  re-enter  the  JV's 
market at any time:  this  must  be  a  realistic  option  and 
represent a  commercially reasonable  course  in  the  light 
of all  objective  circumstances. 
26.  Where  the  parent companies  transfer their entire 
b~siness activities  to  the JV,  and  thereafter act only as 
holding  companies,  this  amounts  to· complete  merger 
from  the economic viewpoint. 
27.  Where the JV takes on only some of the  activities 
that the  parent companies  formerly  carried on indepen-
dently,  this  cim  also  amount to  a concentration.  In  this 
case, the establishment and operation of the JV must not 
lead  to  a  coordination  of  the  parent  companies' 
competitive  behaviour  in  relation  to  other  activities 
which  they  retain.  Coordination  of  competitive 
behaviour  between  any  or all  of the  parent  companies 
and the JV must also  be  excluded ..  Such coordination  is 
likely where there are  close  economic links  between  the 
(')  See  the  Thirteenth  Repon (1983)  on  Competition  Policy, 
point 55. 
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areas of activity of the JV on one side and of the parent 
companies on the other. This applies to upstream, down-
stream and neighbouring product markets. 
28.  The withdrawal of the parent companies need not 
be  simultaneous  with  the  establishment  of the JV.  It  is 
possible  - so  far  as  necessary  - to  allow  the  parent 
companies  a  short transitional  period  to  overcome  any 
staning-up problems  of the JV, especially bottlenecks in 
production or supplies. This period should not normally 
exceed one  year. 
29.  It is  even possible for the establishment of a JV to 
represent  a  concentration  situation  where  the  parent 
companies  remain  permanently  active  on  the  JV's 
product  or service  market.  In  this  case,  however,  the 
parent  companies'  geographic market  must be different 
from  that of the JV.  Moreover, the markets  in  question 
must  be  so  widely  separated, or must present structures 
so  different,  that,  taking  account  of the  nature  of the 
goods or services  concerned and of the  cost of (first or 
renewed)  entry  by  either  into  the.  other's  market, 
competitive interaction  may  be  excluded. 
30.  If the.parent companies' markets  and the JV's are 
in  different  pans  of  the  Community  or  neighbouring 
third  countries,  there  is  a  degree  of  probability  that 
either,  if  it  has  the  necessary  human  and  material 
resources, could extend its activities from the one market 
to the  other. Where  the  territories  are  adjacent or very 
close to each other, this  may even be  assumed to be  the 
case.  At  least  in  this  last  case,  the  actual  allocation  of 
markets  gives  reason  to  suppose  that it  follows  from  a 
coordination  of  competitive  behaviour  between  parent 
companies  and the JV. 
(b)  JVs that undertake  new ·activities on behalf 
of the parent companies 
31.  There  is  normally  no  risk  of coordination in  the 
sense  described  above  where  the  JV  operates  on  a 
product  or service  market  which  the  parent  companies 
individually  have  not entered  and will  not enter in  the 
foreseeable  future,  because  they lack the organizational, 
technical or financial means or because,  in the light of all 
the  objective  circumstances,  such  a  move  would  not 
represent  a  commercially  reasonable  course.  An  indi-
vidual  market  entry  will  also  be  unlikely  where,  after 
establishing the JV, the parent compal)ies no longer have 
the means to make  new investments in  the  same  field,  or where ·an  additional  individual  operation  on  the  JV's 
market would not make commercial sense.  In both cases 
there  is  no competitive  relationship  between the parent 
companies and the JV.  Consequently, there is  no possi-
bility  of  coordination  of  their  competitive  behaviour. 
However, this  assessment  is  only true if the JV's market 
is  neither  upstream  nor  downstream  of,  nor  neigh-
bouring, that of the parent companies. 
32.  The establishment of a JV to operate in  the same 
product or service market as the parent companies but in 
another geographic market involves  the  risk  of coordi-
nation  if  there  is  competitive  interaction  between  the 
parent companies' geographic market and that of the JV. 
(c)  JVs that enter the parent companies' market 
33.  Where  the  parent  companies,  or  one  of  them, 
remain  active  on  the JV's  market  or  remain  potential 
competitors  of  the  JV,  a  coordination  of  competitive 
behaviour  between  the  parent  companies  or  between 
them  and  the  JV  must  be  presumed.  So  long  as  this 
presumption is  not rebutted, the Commission will take it 
that  the  establishment  of  the  JV  does  not  fall  under 
Article  3 (2), subparagraph 2 of the  Regulation. 
(d)  JV  s  that  operate  in  upstream,  downstream 
or neighbouring markets 
34.  If  the JV is  operating in  a market that is  upstream 
or downstream of that of the parent companies, then, in 
general, coordination of purchasing or, as  the case may 
be,  sales  policy  between  the  parent companies  is  likely 
where  they  are  competitors  on  the  upstream  or down-
stream market. 
35.  If the  parent  companies  are  not  competitors,  it 
remains  to be examined whether. there  is  a  real  risk  of 
coordination  of competitive  behaviour  between  the  JV 
and  any of the parents.  This will  normally  be  the  case 
. where the JV's sales or purchases are made in substantial 
measure with the parent companies. 
36.  It is  not possible  to  lay  down  general  principles 
regarding the  likelihood  of coordination  of competitive 
behaviour in  cases  where the parent companies  and the 
JV are active in  neighbouring markets. The outcome will 
depend in  particular on whether the JV's and the parent 
companies'  products  are  technically  or  economically 
linked,  whether  they  are  both  components  of another 
product .or  are  otherwise  mutually  complementary,  and 
whether  the  parent  companies  could  realistically  enter 
the JV's market.  If there  are  no  concrete  opportunities 
for competitive interaction of this kind,  the Commission 
will  treat the JV as  concentrative. 
III.  Other links  between undertakings 
I. Minority  shareholdings 
37.  The  taking  of  a  minority  shareholding  m  an 
undertaking  can  be  considered  a  concentration  within 
the meaning of Article 3 (I) (b)  of the Regulation if the 
new  shareholder acquires  the  possibility of exercising  a 
decisive  influence  on  the  undertaking's  activity.  If the 
acquisition  of  a  minority  shareholding  brings  about  a 
situation·  in  which  there  is  an  undertaking  jointly 
controlled  by  two  or  more  others,  the  principles 
described above  in  relation to JV  s apply. 
38.  As  long  as  the  threshold  of  individual  or  joint 
decisive  influence  has  not been reached,  the  Regulation 
is  not  in  any  event  applicable.  Accordingly,  the 
assessment  under competition law  will  be  made  only in 
relation to the criteria laid down in Articles 8  5 and 86  of 
the EEC Treaty and on the basis of the usual procedural 
rules  for  restrictive  practices  and  abuses  of  dominant 
position ('). 
39.  There  may  likewise  be  a  risk  of  coordination 
where  an  undertaking  acquires  a  majority  or minority 
interest in  another in  which  a  competitor already has  a 
minority  interest. If so,  this  acquisition will  be  assessed 
under Articles  85  and  86  of the EEC Treaty. 
2.  Cross-shareholding 
40.  In  order to  bring their  auto~omous and hitherto 
separate  undertakings  or  groups  closer  together, 
company  owners  often  cause  them  to  exchange  share-
holdings  in  each  other.  Such  reciprocal  influences  can 
serve  to  establish  or to secure  industrial or commercial 
cooperation  between  the  undertakings  or  groups.  But 
they  may  also  result  in  establishing  a  'single  economic 
entity'. In the first  case,  the coordination of competitive 
behaviour  between  independent  undertakings  is 
predominant; in  the second, the result may be  a concen-
tration. Consequently, reciprocal directorships and cross-
shareholdings can only be  evaluated in  relation to  their 
foreseeable  effects  in  each case. 
41.  The  Commission  considers  that  two  or  more 
undertakings  can  also  combine  without  setting  up  a 
parent-subsidiary relationship  and  without either  losing 
its legal personality. Article 3 (I) of the Regulation refers 
not only to  legal,  but also  to  economic concentrations. 
(')  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities  in  Joined  Cases  142  and  156/84  BAT  and 
Reynolds ECR 1987, pp.  4566 and 4577. 
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the  form  of a  combined  group  is,  however,  that  the 
undertakings or groups  concerned  are  not  only subject 
to  a  permanent,  single  economic  management,  but  are 
also  amalgamated into a genuine economic unit, charac-
terised  internally  by  profit  and  loss  compensation 
between the various undertakings within  the groups and 
externally by joint liability. 
3.  Representation  on  controlling  bodies  of other  under-
takings 
42.  Common membership of managing or supervisory 
boards  of  various  undertakings  is  to  be  assessed  in 
accordance  with  the  same  principles  as  cross-share-
holdings. 
4  3.  The  representation  of  one  undertaking  on  the 
decision-making bodies  of another is  usually  the  conse-
quence  of  an  existing  shareholding.  It reinforces  the 
influence of the  investing  undertaking over the  activities 
of the undertaking in which  it holds  a share, because  it 
affords  it  the  opportunity  of obtaining  information  on 
the  activities of a competitor or of taking an  active pan 
in  its  commercial  decisions. 
44.  Thus,  common  membership  of  the  respective 
boards  may  be  the  vehicle  for. the  coordination  of the 
competitive behaviour of the undertakings concerned, or 
for  a concentration of undertakings within  the  meaning 
of the Regulation. This will  depend on the circumstances 
of the  individual  case,  among which  the  economic  link 
between  the  shareholding  and  the  personal  connection 
must  always  be  examined.  This  is  equally  true  of 
unilateral  and  reciprocal  relationships  between  under-
takings. 
45.  Personal  connections  not accompanied  by  share-
holdings  are to be  judged according to the  same criteria 
as  shareholding  relationships  between  undertakings.  A 
majority of seats  on  the  managing or supervisory board 
of an  undertaking  will  normally  imply  control  of the 
latter; a minority of seats  at least a degree of influence 
over  its  commercial policy,  which  may  further entail  a 
coordination of behaviour. Reciprocal connections justify 
a presumption that the undertakings concerned are coor-
dinating  their  business  conduct.  A  very  wide  commu-
nality of membership  of the  respective  decision-making 
bodies - that is,  up  to half of the  members or more -
may be  an  indication of a concentration. 
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4.  Transfers  of  undertakings  or parts  of  undertakings 
46.  A transfer of assets  or shares falls  within the defi- · 
nition of a concentration,  according to Article  3 (I) (b) 
of the  Regulation,  if  it  results  in  the  acquirer  gaining 
control  of all  or of part of orie  or more  undertakings. 
However,  the  situation  is  different  where  the  transfer 
conferring control over pan of an  undertaking is  linked 
with  an  agreement  to  coordinate  the  competitive 
behaviour  of the  undertakings  concerned,  or where  it 
necessarily leads to or is  accompanied by coordination of 
the business conduct of undertakings which remain inde-
pendent. Cases of this kind are not covered by the Regu-
lation:  they must  be  examined  according  to Articles  85 
and  86  of the  EEC  Treaty  and  under  the  appropriate 
implementing Regulations. 
47.  The  practical  application  of this  rule  requires  a 
distinction  between  unilateral  and  reciprocal 
arrangements. A unilateral acquisition of assets  or shares 
strongly suggests  that the Regulation  is  applicable.  The 
contrary needs  to  be  demonstrated  by  clear evidence of 
the  likelihood of coordination of the parties' competitive 
behaviour. A reciprocal acquisition of assets or shares, by 
contrast, will  usually follow from  an agreement between 
the  undertakings  concerned  as  to  their  investments, 
production  or sales,  and  thus serves  to  coordinate their 
competitive  behaviour.  A  concentration  situation  does 
not exist where  a reciprocal  transfer of assets  or shares 
forms  pan of a specialization or restructuring agreement 
or other type of coordination. Coordination presupposes 
in  any  event  that  the  parties  remain  at  least  potential 
competitors after the  exchange has  taken place. 
5.  Joint  acquisition  of  an  undertaking  with a view to  its 
division 
48.  Where  several  undertakings  jointly  acqu~re 
another,  the  principles  for  the  assessment  of  a  JOtnt 
venture  are  applicable,  provided  that  within  the 
acquisition  operation,  the  period  of joint  control  goes 
beyond the very  short term.  In  this  case  the  Regulation 
may or may not be applicable, depending on the concen-
trative  or cooperative  nature of the JV.  If, by  contrast, 
the sole object of the agreement is  to divide up  the assets 
of the  undertaking and this  agreement is  put into effect 
immediately  after  the  acquisition,  then,  in  accordance 
with  the  24th recital,  the Regulatidn  applies. Commission notice regarding restrictions ancillary to concentrations 
I.  Introduction 
I.  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21 
December  1989  on  the  control  of  concentrations 
between  undertakings  ('the  Regulation') (')  states  in  its 
25th recital that its  application is  not excluded where the 
undertakings  concerned  accept  restrictions  which  are 
directly  related and  necessary  to  the  implementation  of 
the  concentration,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  'ancillary 
restrictions'.  In  the  scheme  of  the  Regulation,  such 
restrictions are  to be assessed  together with the concen-
tration  itself.  It  follows,  as  confirmed  by  Article  8 (2), 
second  subparagraph,  last  sentence  of the  Regulation, 
that  a  decision  declaring  the  concentration  compatible 
also covers  these restrictions. In  this  situation, under the 
provisions of Article  22,  paragraphs  I  and 2,  the  Regu-
lation is  solely applicable, to the exclusion of Regulation 
No 17 (')as well  as  Regulations  (EEC) No 1017/68 ('), 
(EEC)  No 4056/86 (')  and  (EEC)  No 3975/87 ('). This 
avoids  parallel  Commission  proceedings,  one concerned 
with  the  assessment  of  the  concentration  under· the 
Regulation,  and  the  other  aimed  at  the  application  of 
Articles  85  and 86  to the restrictions which are  ancillary: 
to the concentration. 
2.  In  this  notice,  the  Commission sets  out to  indicate 
the  interpretation  it  gives  to  the  notion  of 'restrictions 
directly related  and  necessary  to the  implementation  of 
the  concentration'.  Under  the  Regulation  such 
restrictions  must  be  assessed  in  relation  to  the  concen-
tration, whatever their treatment might be  under Articles 
8  5  and  86  if  they  were  to  be  considered  in  isolation 
or  in  a  different  economic  context.  The  Commission 
endeavours,  within  the  limits  set by  the  Regulation,  to 
take the  greatest account of business practice and of the 
conditions  necessary  for  the implementation of concen-
trations. 
This  notice  is  without  prejudice  to  the  interpretation 
which  may  be  given  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Communities. 
(')  OJ No L 395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  I. 
(')  OJ No 13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(')  OJ No L 175,  23.  7.  1968,  p.  I. 
(')  OJ No L 378,  31.  12.  1986,  p.  4. 
(')  OJ No L 374,  31.  12.  1987,  p.  I. 
II.  Principles of  evaluation 
3.  The  'restrictions'  meant  are  those  agreed  on 
between the parties to the concentration which limit their 
own  freedom  of  action  in  the . market.  They  do  not 
include  restrictions  to  the  detriment of third parties.  If 
such  restrictions  are  the  inevitable  consequence  of the 
concentration itself,  they must be assessed  together with 
it under the provisions ofArticle 2 of the Regulation. If, 
on  the contrary,  such  restrictive  effects  on  third parties 
are separable from the aoncentration they may,  if appro-
priate,  be  the  subject  of an  assessment  of compatibility 
with Articles  85  and 86  of the EEC Treaty.  · · 
4.  For  restncttons  to  be  considered  'directly related' 
they  must  be  ancillary  to  the  implementation  of  the 
concentration, that is  to say subordinate in importance to 
the  main  object  of the  concentration.  They  cannot  be 
substantial  restrictions  wholly  different  in  nature  from 
those which result from  the  concentration itself.  Neither 
are they contractual arrangements which are  among the 
elements  constituting  the  concentration,  such  as  those 
establishing  economic  unity  between  previously  inde-
pendent  parties,  or  organizing  joint  control  by  two 
undertakings of another undertaking. As  integral parts of 
the concentration, the latter arrangements constitute the 
very  subject matter of the  evaluation  to be  carried out 
under the  Regulation. 
Also  excluded, for concentrations which  are  carried out 
in  stages,  are  the  contractual  arrangements  relating  to 
the  stages before  the establishment of control within the 
meaning  of Article  3,  paragraphs  I  and  3 of the  Regu-
lation.  For these, Articles 85 and 86  remain applicable  as 
long  as  the  conditions  set  out  in  Article  3  are  not 
fulfilled. 
The  notion  of  directly  related  restrictions  likewise 
excludes  from  the  application  of  the  Regulation 
additional  restrictions  agreed  at  the  same  time  which 
have  no  direct  link  with  the  concentration.  It  is  not 
enough  that the additional restrictions exist in  the  same 
context as  the  concentration. 
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implementation of the  concentration', which  means  that 
in  their  absence  the  concentration  could  not  be 
implemented or could only be  implemented under more 
uncertain conditions, at substantially higher cost, over an 
appreciably longer period or with considerably less prob-
ability  of success.  This  must be  judged on an  objective 
basis. 
6.  The question  of whether a  restriction  meets  these 
conditions  cannot  be  answered  in  general  terms.  In 
particular as concerns the necessity of the restriction, it is 
proper not only to take account of its nature, but equally 
to ensure, in  applying the rule of proportionality, that· its 
duration  and  subject  matter,  and  geographic  field  of 
application,  do  not exceed  what the  implementation of 
the concentration reasonably requires.  If alternatives are 
available  for  the  attainment  .of  the  legitimate  aim 
pursued, the undertakings must choose the one which is 
objectively the least restrictive of competition. 
These principles  will  be followed  and further developed 
by  the  Commission's  practice  in  individual  cases. 
However,  it  is  already  possible,  on  the  basis  of  past 
experience,  to  indicate the attitude the Commission will 
take to those restrictions most commonly encountered in 
relation  to  the  transfer  of  undertakings  or  parts  of 
undertakings,  the  division  of undertakings  or of their 
assets  following  a  joint  acquisition  of  control,  or  the 
creation of concentrative joint ventures. 
III.  Evaluation of common ancillary restrictions in  cases 
of the transfer of an undertaking 
A.  Non-competition clauses 
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1.  Among the ancillary restrictions which meet the 
criteria  set  out  in  the  Regulation  are  contractual 
prohibitions  on  competition  which  are  imposed  on 
the vendor in the context of a concentration achieved 
by  the  transfer  of  an  undertaking  or  pan  of  an 
undertaking._ Such prohibitions guarantee the transfer 
to the  acquirer of the  full  value  of the  assets  trans-
ferred,  which in  general include both physical assets 
and  intangible assets  such  as  the goodwill which the 
vendor  has  accumulated  or  the  know-how  he  has 
developed. These are  not only directly related to the 
concentration,  but  are  also  necessary  for  its 
implementation  because,  in  their  absence,  there 
would be  reasonable grounds to expect that the sale 
of the  undertaking or pan of an  undertaking could 
not be  accomplished  satisfactorily.  In  order to  take 
over  fully  the  value  of  the  assets  transferred,  the 
acquirer must be able to benefit from some protection 
against  competitive  acts  of the  vendor .in  order  to 
gain  the  loyalty of customers  and  to  assimilate  and 
exploit  the  know-how.  Such  protection  cannot 
generally be  considered  necessary when  de  facto  the 
transfer  is  limited  to  physical. assets  (such  as  land, 
buildings or machinery) or to exclusive industrial and 
commercial  property  rights  (the  holders  of  which 
could  immediately  take  action  against  infringements 
by the transferor of such rights). 
However,  such  a  prohibition  on  competmon  IS 
justified  by  the  legitimate  objective  sought  of 
implementing  the  concentration  only  when  its 
duration,  its  geographical  field  of  application,  its 
subject  matter and  the  persons  subject  to  it  do  not 
exceed what is  reasonably necessary to that end. 
2.  With  regard  to  the  acceptable  duration  of  a 
prohibition on competition, a period of five years has 
been recognized  as  appropriate when  the  transfer of 
the  undertaking  includes  the  goodwill  and 
know-how,  and  a  period  of  two  years  when  it 
includes  only the  goodwill.  However,  these  are  not 
absolute rules;  they do not preclude a prohibition of 
longer duration in particular circumstances, where for 
example  the  parties  can  demonstrate  that  customer 
loyalty will  persist for a period longer than two years 
cir  that  the  economic  life  cycle  of  the  products 
concerned  is  longer  than  five  years  and  should  be 
taken into account. 
3.  The  geographic  scope  of the  non-competition 
clause  must be  limited  to  the  area where the  vendor 
had  established  the  products  or services  before  the 
transfer. It does not appear objectively necessary that 
the  acquirer  be  protected  from  competition  by  the 
vendor  in  territories  which  the  vendor  had  not 
previously penetrated. 
4.  In the same manner, the non-competition clause 
must be  limited  to products and services which form 
the  economic activity of the  undertaking transferred. 
In  particular,  in  the  case  of  a  partial  transfer  of 
assets,  it  does  not appear that the  acquirer needs  to 
be  protected  from ·the  competition  of the vendor in 
the products or services which constitute the activities 
which the vendor retains after the transfer. 5.  The vendor  may  bind  himself,  his  subsidiaries 
and  commercial  agents.  However,  an  obligation  to 
impose  similar  restrictions  on  others  would · not 
qualify  as  an  ancillary  restriction.  This  applies  in 
particular to  clauses  which  would  restrict  the  scope 
for resellers or users to import or export. 
6.  Any protection of the vendor is not normally an 
ancillary restriction  and  is  therefore  to be  examined 
under Articles 85  and 86 of th EEC Treaty. 
B.  Licences  of industrial  and  commercial  property  rights 
and of  know-how 
l.  The implementation of a  transfer of an  under-
taking  or part of  an  undertaking generally  includes 
the transfer  to  the  acquirer,  with  a view  to  the  full 
exploitation  of  the  assets  transferred,  of  rights  to 
industrial  or  commercial  property  or  know-how. 
However,  the vendor may  remain  the  owner of the 
rights  in  order  to  exploit  them  for  activities  other 
than  those  transferred.  In  these  cases,  the  usual 
· means for ensuring that the acquirer will have the full 
use  of the  assets  transferred  is  to conclude licensing 
agreements in his favour. 
2.  Simple  or exclusive  licences· of patents,  similar 
rights  or  existing  know-how  can  be  accepted  as 
necessary for the completion  of the  transaction,  and 
likewise agreements to grant such liCences. They may 
be  limited  to certain fields  of use,  to  the  extent that 
they correspond  to the  activities  of  the  undertaking 
transferred.  Normally  it  will  not  be  necessary  for 
such  licences  to  include  territorial  limitations  on 
manufacture which reflect the territory of the activity 
transferred.  Licences  may  be  granted  for  the  whole 
duration  of  ihe  patent  or  similar  rights  or  the 
duration  of  the  normal  economic  life  of  the 
know-how.  As  such  licences  are  economically  equi-
valent to a partial transfer of rights, they need not be 
limited in time. 
3.  Restrictions  in  licence  agreements,  going 
beyond what is  provided above, fall  outside the scope 
of the  Regulation.  They  must  be  assessed  on  their 
merits  according  to  Article  85 (1)  and  (3). 
Accordingly,  where  they  fulfil  the  conditions 
required, they may benefit from the block exemptions 
provided  for  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No 2349/84  on 
patent licences (')  or Regulation  (EEC)  No  559/89 
on kflow-how licences ('). 
(')  OJ No  L 219,  16.  8.  1984,  p.  15. 
(')  OJ No L 61,  4.  3.  1989,  p.  I. 
· 4.  The  same  principles  are  to  be  applied  by 
analogy  in  the  case  of  licences  of  trademarks, 
business  names  or similar  rights.  There may  be  situ-
ations where the vendor wishes  to remain  the  owner 
.of such rights in relation to activities retained, but the 
acquirer needs  the rights  to  use  them  to market the 
products constituting the  object of the  activity of the 
undertaking or part of an undertaking transferred. 
In such  circumstances,  the conclusion  of agreements 
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  confusion  between 
trademarks may be necessary. 
C.  Purchase and supply agreements 
l.  In many cases, the transfer of an undertaking or 
part of  an  undertaking  can  entail  the  disruption  of 
traditional  lines  of internal  procurement  and supply 
resulting  from  the  previous  integration  of activities 
within  the  economic  entity of the  vendor.  To make 
possible  the  break up  of the economic  unity  of the 
vendor and  the  partial  transfer of  the  assets  to  the 
acquirer  under  reasonable  conditions,  it  is  often 
necessary  to  maintain,  at  least  for  a  transitional 
period,  similar  links  between  the  vendor  and  the 
acquirer.  This  objective  is  normally  attained  by  the 
conclusion  of  purchase  and  supply  agreements 
between  the  vendor  and  the  acquirer  of the  under-
taking or part of an  undertaking. Taking account of 
the particular situation resulting from the break up of 
the  economic  unity  of the  vendor  such  obligations, 
which may lead to restrictions of competition, can be 
recognized as  ancillary. They may be  in favour of the 
vendor as well as the acquirer. 
2.  The legitimate  aim  of such  obligations  may  be 
to ensure the continuity of supply to one or other of 
the  parties  of  products  necessary  to  the  activities 
retained  (for  the  vendor)  or  taken  over  (for  the 
acquirer).  Thus,  there  are  grounds  for  recognizing, 
for  a  transitional  period,  the  need  for  supply  obli-
gations  aimed  at  guaranteeing  the  quantities 
previously  supplied  within  the  vendor's  integrated 
business  or enabling  their adjustment  in  accordance 
with the development of the  ma~ket. 
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outlets  for  one  or the  other of the  parties,  as  they 
were  previously  assured  within the  single  economic 
entity. For the same  reason, obligations providing for 
fixed  quantities, possibly with a variation clause, may 
be recognized as necessary. 
3.  However, there does not appear to  be  a general 
justification  for  exclusive  purchase  or  supply  obli-
gations.  Save·  in  exceptional  . circumstances,  .  for 
example  resulting  from  the  absence  of a  market  or 
the  specificity  of  products,  such  exclusivity  is  not 
objectively necessary to permit the implementation of 
a concentration in the form of a transfer of an  under-
taking or part of an undertaking. 
In  any  event,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality,  the  undertakings  concerned  are 
bound  to consider whether there  are  no  alternative 
means  to  the  ends  pursued,  such  as  agreements 
for  fixed  quantities,  which  are  less  restrictive  than 
exclusivity. 
4.  As· for the  duration of procurement and supply 
obligations, this must be limited to a period necessary 
for the replacement of the relationship of dependency 
by  autonomy  in  market.  The  duration  of  such  a 
period must be objectively justified. 
rv.  Evaluation  of ancillary  restrictions  in  the case  of a 
joint acquisition 
1.  As  set  out  in  the  24th  recital,  the  Regulation  is 
applicable  when  two  or  more  undertakings  agree  to 
acquire jointly the control of one or more other under-
takings,  in  particular by  means  of a public tender offer, 
where  the object or effect  is  the  division  among  them-
selves  of  the  undertakings  or  their  assets.  This  is  a 
concentration implemented in  two successive  stages; the 
common strategy is  limited to  the acquisition of control. 
For  the  transaction  to  be  concentrative,  the  joint 
acquisition must be followed by a  clea~ separation of the 
undertakings or assets  concerned. 
2.  For  this  purpose,  an  agreement  by  the  joint 
acquirers  of  an  undertaking  to  abstain  from  making 
separate competing offers  for  the  same  undertaking,  or 
otherwise  acquiring  control,  may  be  considered  an 
ancillary restriction. 
3.  Restrictions  limited  to  putting  the  division  into 
effect are to be  considered directly related and necessary 
to  the  implementation  of  the  concentration.  This  will 
apply to arrangements made between  the parties for the 
joint  acquisition  of coqtrol  in  order  to  divide  among 
themselves  the  production  facilities  or the  distribution 
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networks  together  with  tlie  extstmg  trademarks  of the 
undertaking  acquired  in  common.  The  implementation 
of this  division may not in any circumstances lead to the 
coordination  of the  future  behaviour  of  the  acquiring 
undertakings. 
4.  To  the  extent  that  such  a  division  involves  the 
break up of a pre-existing economic entity, arrangements 
that  make  the  break  up  possible  under  reasonable 
conditions  must  be  considered  ancillary.  In  this  regard, 
the  principles  explained  above  in  relation  to  purchase 
and  supply  arrangements  over  a  transitional  period  in 
cases  of transfer  of undertakings  should  be  applied  by 
analogy. 
V.  Evaluation of ancillary restrictions in cases of _concen-
trative joint ventures within the meaning of Article 3 (2) 
subparagraph 2 of the  Regulation 
This  evaluation  must  take  account of the characteristics 
peculiar to concentrative  joint ventures,  the  constituent 
elements  of  which  are  the  creation  of an  autonomous 
economic entity exercising  on a  long-term  basis  all  the 
functions of an undertaking,  and  the absence of coordi-
nation  of  competitive  behaviour  between  the  parent 
undertakings  and  between  them  and  the  joint venture. 
This condition implies  in  principle the  withdrawal of the 
parent  undertakings  from  the  market  assigned  to  the 
joint  venture  and,  therefore,  their  disappearance  as 
actual or potential competitors of the new entity. 
A.  Non-competition obligations 
To the extent that a prohibition on the parent under-
takings  competing  with  the  joint  venture  aims  at 
expressing the  reality of the lasting withdrawal of the 
parents from the market assigned to the joint venture, 
it  will  be  recognized  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
concentration. 
B.  Licence5 for  indu5trial  an4  commercial  property  right5 
and know-how 
The creation  of a  new  autonomous  economic  entity 
usually  involves  the  transfer  of  the  tec!mology 
necessary for carrying on the activities assigned to it, 
in  the  form  of  a  transfer  of  rights  and  related 
know-how.  Where  the  parent  undertakings  intend 
nonetheless  to  retain the  property rights,  particularly 
with the aim of exploitation in  other fields of use,  the transfer  of  technology  to  the  joint venture  may  be 
accomplished by means of licences. Such  licences  may 
be exclusive,  without having to be  limited  in  duration 
or territory, for they serve only as  a substitute for the 
transfer  of  property  rights.  They  must  therefore  be 
considered  necessary  to  the  implementation  of  the 
concentration. 
C.  Purchase and supply obligations 
If the  parent undertakings remain present in  a market 
upstream  or downstream  of that of the joint venture, 
any  purchase  and  supply  agreements  are  to  be 
examined  in accordance with  the principles applicable 
in  the case of the  transfer of an  undertaking. 
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